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ABSTRACT 
The U.S. military is currently in an era of change highlighted by a shift in focus 
from small-scale and limited wars involving counterterrorism (CT) and 
counterinsurgency (COIN) to preparations for large-scale combat operations with a near-
peer threat. This shift has placed emphasis on conventional focus in training, education, 
and planning to stand ready for a potential conflict as the United States continues to 
maintain its unilateral grip as the world’s lone superpower, and Russia and China try to 
expand their spheres of influence in the great power competition (GPC). But, as with the 
Cold War, it is unlikely this showdown will occur. Conversely, it is far more probable 
conflict will be highlighted by competition through state-sponsored insurgencies, proxy 
wars, and a struggle over influence. Special operations forces (SOF) therefore must 
balance their understanding and preparedness of conventional warfare while standing 
ready to execute unconventionally. The wargame Rebels and States is designed to train 
entry-level SOF candidates in the interaction between the insurgent and counterinsurgent, 
utilizing COIN and unconventional warfare (UW) doctrine as a basis while also 
employing the concepts of insurgent, resistance, and COIN theorists. This wargame is to 
aid SOF candidates as they prepare to serve in their operational units, providing a venue 
to test strategies and understandings of COIN and UW principles, and ensure an 
enhanced education in doctrine and theory.
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On 01 March 2020, news broke that the U.S. had reached a peace deal with the 
Taliban that would result in the reduction and eventual withdraw of U.S. forces in 
Afghanistan. The potential peace deal marked the beginning of the end of an era. What 
started with U.S. special operations forces (SOF) soldiers riding in on horseback and 
overthrowing the Taliban evolved into an 18-year counterinsurgency (COIN) fight. While 
the U.S. has shifted its focus from COIN to a new era of great power competition (GPC), 
it is imperative that SOF continue to understand, train, and test their abilities to stand ready 
to support strategic objectives of the U.S., in all aspect of warfare, not just a conventional, 
large scale combat operations (LSCO) fight. 
While we, the authors, had already been conceptualizing the game called Rebels 
and States, the potential peace deal struck in Afghanistan only reinforced our desire to 
create a wargame that could serve as an educational tool for the next generation of SOF 
soldiers. We both have a vested interest in the production and success of this game outside 
of academic requirements and intend it to aid in teaching, coaching, and mentoring our 
fellow soldiers.1 Furthermore, we both had identified a need for a complementary way of 
training entry-level SOF soldiers and support personnel and retraining current SOF 
operators in the main insurgent and counterinsurgent strategies during our time serving in 
the operational force.  
Over the course of several months, we utilized our own military and wargame 
production experiences, research, and input from peers to produce Rebels and States. As 
highlighted by Peter Perla, we followed a modified version of James Dunnigan’s “Ten step 
process for the game design,” combining elements of his process and our own experiences 
in developing wargames.2 This chapter serves as a road map for the remainder of the 
 
1 Department of the Army, Army Leadership and the Profession, ADP 6–22 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 2019), 1–22, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/
ARN20039_ADP%206-22%20C1%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf. 
2 Peter P. Perla and John Curry, Peter Perla’s The Art of Wargaming: A Guide for Professionals and 
Hobbyists (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 177. 
 
2 
documentation of our process, our results, and our recommendations for future 
development. Chapter II describes the baseline version of Rebels and States that is rooted 
in doctrine. Chapter III provides the design of the game. Chapter IV discusses our 
modifications, to include the introduction of the doctrine and theorists of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency. Chapter V provides an overview and walkthrough of Rebels and States. 
Chapter VI presents our conclusions with recommendations for future analysis or 
modifications.  
A. SPECIAL FORCES AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
United States Special Forces (USSF) have long been the proponent of 
unconventional warfare (UW). USSF’s role in UW is to work “through and with an 
underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla forces in a denied area,” to provide policy makers and 
strategists the time and space to execute successful political warfare.3 Such a mission is 
inherently sensitive to all levels of the military and government, and having soldiers who 
are well versed in the area is crucial to meeting strategic objectives. Additionally, a 
thorough understanding of UW provides the insight on how to counter insurgencies, 
without focusing solely on just terrorism, one of many tactics used within UW.4 With a 
thorough understanding of how to be an insurgent, a soldier can conversely develop a better 
understanding how best to counter an insurgent through counterinsurgent (COIN) 
strategies. The relationship between irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, and 




3 USASOC, Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide (Ft. Bragg, NC: USASOC, 2016), 5, 
https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/Unconventional%20Warfare%20Pocket%
20Guide_v1%200_Final_6%20April%202016.pdf; David Maxwell, “Unconventional Warfare Does Not 
Belong to Special Forces,” War on the Rocks, August 12, 2013, https://warontherocks.com/2013/08/
unconventional-warfare-does-not-belong-to-special-forces/; Doug Livermore, “It’s Time for Special 
Operations to Dump ‘Unconventional Warfare,’” War on the Rocks, October 6, 2017, 
https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/its-time-for-special-operations-to-dump-unconventional-warfare/. 




Figure 1. USSOCOM Activities.5 
To fully comprehend the complexities of both UW and COIN requires discipline 
developed through a decades long career that fundamentally starts at the Special Forces 
Qualification Course (SFQC). As the U.S. shifts its focus to GPC, the military has called 
upon the SFQC to become more streamlined, placing less emphasis on a wholistic skill set 
and more on basic doctrine and fundamentals. MG E. John Deedrick, the former 
commander of 1st Special Forces Command (SFC), stated “I want somebody physically 
fit, culturally astute, morally straight, understands small unit tactics and how to apply that 
with a partner force. And someone who can problem solve. You give me that raw material 
coming out of the course and we’ll do just fine.”6 Yet this is becoming harder to achieve 
as pressure is put on SFQC cadre and commanders to produce USSF soldiers more quickly 
to meet the demands of the force. Inherently, the SFQC must look at alternative methods 
when instructing their students. 
The modern world is providing new methods to utilize the fundamentals taught 
within the SFQC. Military doctrine has added space and cyber to the traditional land, sea, 
and air domains to create Multi-Domain Operations (MDO).7 The Army Special 
 
5 Source: USASOC, Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide, 4. 
6 Lolita Balbor, “Big Changes to Grueling Special Forces Course Draw Scrutiny,” AP NEWS, October 
13, 2019, https://apnews.com/de165494a09d4e7bb022bcdd7a150f7f. 




Operations Forces (ARSOF) strategy states that “the entire ARSOF formation will 
understand what it will bring to future MDOs,” meaning SOF will have to discover how 
best to execute its given missions within new environments, and the SFQC will have to 
instruct new soldiers to do the same.8 Furthermore, the ARSOF strategy emphasizes 
“innovation: bold experimentation, unafraid to fail en-route to revolutionary concepts and 
technology.”9 Alternative methods must be developed to test the new aspects of UW and 
COIN before it is employed. Furthermore, these methods must be taught to the next 
generation of USSF soldiers to be prepared to immediately operate within the MDO 
environment and meet the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) 
commander’s intent.  
B. WARGAMING AS A TRAINING METHOD 
Wargaming is “a simulation of a military operation, by whatever means, using 
specific rules, data, methods, and procedures.”10 It has long been a method to teach, train, 
and test new methods and strategies, allowing leaders at all levels to gain new insights into 
warfare. A wargame that implements aspects of a modern, complex operating environment 
while teaching and reinforcing doctrinal and theoretical fundamentals serves as an 
alternative option in educating new recruits and training veterans. It provides a low cost, 
low risk method to teach the interaction and struggle between the insurgent and 
counterinsurgent, providing a heuristic training method that fully develops a special 
operations warrior. 
Educational wargames seek to teach and expose players to new concepts. One of 
the best examples of educational wargames was the Prussian development of Kriegsspiel 
(German for “wargaming”). Before, during, and in between the German wars of 
unification, Kriegsspiel was an incredibly detailed wargame that allowed Prussian officers 
 
8 Francis Beaudette, Army Special Operations Forces Strategy (Ft. Bragg, NC: USASOC, 2018), 
https://www.soc.mil/AssortedPages/ARSOF_Strategy.pdf. 
9 Beaudette. 
10 Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Defence Wargaming Handbook (Wiltshire, England: Ministry of 




to practice employing their formations in incredible detail using charts and tables to reflect 
battlefield interactions.11 While these games were generally effective, they were slow 
because of the amount of time required to adjudicate results of each tactical decision. The 
advent of “free” Kriegsspiel was developed using combat-experienced Prussian officers to 
serve as adjudicators to speed up the process of determining who won each engagement.12 
While there are many factors that allowed the Prussians to successfully conquer the other 
German principalities, the Austrians, and subsequently the French, Kriegsspiel allowed 
Prussian officers to prepare for combat operations and maintain valuable experience across 
multiple generations of military leaders. The modern-day lesson for both conventional and 
SOF soldiers is that during periods of transition where training resources may become 
scarce, experiential wargaming is a time-tested method of maintaining a body of 
knowledge and expertise in the force. Sun Tzu explains this concept succinctly in The Art 
of War: 
Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple 
ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few 
calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few 
calculations to defeat.13 
By participating in a wargame, a player executes a vast array of calculations. 
Wargaming allows the player to apply Sun Tzu’s teaching by visualizing and experiencing 
the battlefield well before the battle commences. Furthermore, it displays the weakness and 
strengths of approaches and strategies, resulting in modifications to plans that set the 
players on a pathway to future success. 
C. PURPOSE AND DESIGN OF REBELS AND STATES 
The purpose of Rebels and States is to teach the relationship and interaction 
between the insurgent and counterinsurgent in a two-sided competition for control and 
legitimacy of a fictional nation. The wargame uses the doctrinal tasks and methodologies 
 
11 Perla and Curry, Peter Perla’s the Art of Wargaming, 42. 
12 Perla and Curry, 42. 




of UW and COIN as a foundation while exposing the player to insurgent and 
counterinsurgent theorists. The primary audience is the students of the SFQC as a means 
to further their educational experience before assignment to operational Special Forces 
Groups (SFG). The secondary audience is support staff within SOF organizations that have 
not had exposure to insurgency and counterinsurgency in the same way that SOF operators 
have. Our purpose and audience are what led us to specifically select the four insurgent 
strategies and the four counterinsurgent strategies that are introduced in the 18A: Special 
Forces Officer Course in the SFQC. The four UW/insurgent strategists are Mao Tse Tung, 
the Cuban Revolution, T.E. Lawrence, and U.S. UW doctrine; the COIN strategists are 
David Galula, Robert Thompson, the Operation Enduring Freedom- Philippines (OEF-P) 
Basilan Model, and U.S. COIN doctrine.14 
The learning objectives we chose are a combination of our own analysis of what 
the players of Rebels and States should understand, what we wanted to reinforce, and our 
synthesis of the Terminal Learning Objectives (TLOs) from the SFQC 18A Special Forces 
Officer Course. Once our analysis was complete, we utilized this a guide when developing 
the functions and different aspects of Rebels and States. Appendix A describes the details 
of how each part of the game meets the following learning objectives: 
• Comprehend the doctrinal strategies of insurgency and COIN 
• Understand the seven phases of U.S. sponsored UW 
• Understand the five tenets of U.S. COIN doctrine 
• Comprehend the theoretical strategies of insurgency and COIN 
 
14 Special Forces Officer Course, TLO: Components of Insurgency (Ft. Bragg, NC: 18A AOC 
Training, 2016); Special Forces Officer Course, TLO: Fundamentals of Counterinsurgency (Ft. Bragg, NC: 
18A AOC Training, 2017); Special Forces Officer Course, TLO: Introduction to Insurgencies (Ft. Bragg, 
NC: 18A AOC Training, 2017); Special Forces Officer Course, TLO: Seven Dynamics of a Successful 
Insurgency (Ft. Bragg, NC: Special Forces Qualification (SF DET OFF), 2016); Special Forces Officer 




• Understand the three phases of Mao Tse Tung’s strategy of 
Protracted War 
• Understand the two fundamentals of the Cuban Revolution 
insurgency strategy 
• Understand the three elements and three treatises of T.E. 
Lawrence’s insurgency strategy 
• Understand the five principles of Robert Thompson’s COIN 
strategy 
• Understand the eight steps of David Galula’s COIN strategy 
• Understand the five legs of the OEF-P Basilan COIN model 
• Comprehend the fundamental infrastructure of an insurgency 
• Comprehend how the doctrinal and theoretical strategies interact 
• Comprehend how a complex operation environment affects the application 
of strategies 
• Reinforce doctrinal terms and graphics 
The game structure is optimized to expose and familiarize each player with 
challenges and requirements associated with being either an insurgent or counterinsurgent. 
Critical lessons are derived from the interaction between strategies. As players employ 
different strategies against their opponent, the interaction between those strategies will 
allow both players to glean insights from the results.  
In order to effectively convey these theories to the players, strategies are defined 
and outlined in the rules packet. Players are provided with sufficient definition and 
explanation of each strategy in order to ensure that game play reflects realistic outcomes. 
While wargames are mere representations of reality, the critical requirement for Rebels and 
States relies on the ability to correctly understand the inherent strengths and weaknesses of 
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each type of insurgent and counterinsurgent strategy. To make the game understandable to 
new players, each strategy is simplified into a basic premise, making it usable during the 
conduct of the wargame. During game play, players have access to the description of each 
strategy in the form of their strategy cards, which also describe what additional rules are 
applied to each strategist. The game is not designed to test one theory over another, but 
rather as means to inform the players on how each will interact. 
While the players themselves will be contending with the prospect of trying to 
understand their respective strategies, other actors and forces that typically occupy the 
insurgent environment are replicated using game mechanics. The actions of these third 
parties and environmental effects are randomized in order to challenge the players to deal 
with new situations. These game mechanics replicate a complex operating environment 
that often makes military operations even more challenging.  
When playtesting, the focus was on ensuring the mechanics met our intent and 
objectives. During blind playtests, with volunteers who had not previously seen the game, 
the volunteers were all mid-career SOF officers with experience in the subject matter, 
experience in developing wargames, or both. The population all had at least a decade of 
experience in the U.S. Army and had all deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan. The focus of 
these playtests was to ensure the game functioned correctly and effectively reinforced the 
different strategies.  
D. RESULTS 
The final version of the wargame stays within our original parameters and intent. 
The two-sided wargame incorporates the key aspects of an insurgency/counterinsurgency 
environment. More importantly it educates and reinforces the selected strategies through 
the use of constraints, limitations, and bonuses for certain aspects of the doctrine and 
theorists, meeting our main objective for the game. Furthermore, Rebels and States forces 
the players to not just understand their chosen strategy, but also requires them to understand 
the opposing strategy. Ultimately, the players each attempt to gain legitimacy and meet the 
additional winning requirement as described by their chosen strategy. 
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The process of the game play follows a back-and-forth method between the two 
sides as they move through five different phases: Recruitment, Deployment, Movement, 
Engagement, and Consolidation. The game board accounts for terrain, population size, and 
adjacent countries. The environment cards describe the politics, economics, society, the 
media, and security forces within the game, setting the stage for an environment that favors 
either the insurgent or the state. The combination of the game board and environment cards 
results in over 90,000 different combinations at the start of the game. This allows for a 
thorough analysis by the players before selecting their strategy, which is the last step in the 
Pre-game phase. 
As the players maneuver around the game board, they have the option to move, 
engage with opponents, and build up their forces to control populations that give them 
recruits and legitimacy. Each of their strategies gives them certain bonuses for each aspect, 
step, or tenet. But each of these bonuses are not readily apparent, so they are forced to 
contemplate how their actions will affect their opponent and their own goals in future turns.  
Ultimately, Rebels and States has an end point. This is represented by a player 
achieving 15 legitimacy points while also meeting an additional winning condition 
associated with their given strategy. These winning conditions are related to the 
overarching theme of each strategy and are counterbalanced by the same winning 
conditions of an opposing strategy. In the event of a time constrained learning environment, 
the players can choose to forgo this requirement and play strictly for the attainment of 
legitimacy points. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Rebels and States has met our original intent of providing an alternate learning 
method for entry-level SOF operators. Furthermore, the wargame will not only help 
educate our secondary audience, SOF support staff, but also can be used to retrain a COIN 
or UW mindset for current SOF operators. Appendix A describes how aspects of the game 
meet our desired learning objectives, which are also correlated with the TLOs developed 
by the SFQC.  
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Future research or modifications to Rebels and States should include a digitized 
version. While a table top version provides the desired learning experience, a digital 
version can speed up the game through immediate calculations of recruitment points based 
on game parameters, quick adjudications of engagements, and other game mechanics and 
rules incorporated within the digital constraints. A digital version of the game would also 
allow players to experience Rebels and States from their own electronic devices without 
having to meet in person for an educational experience. 
Furthermore, we designed modifications of the game to meet specific areas of the 
world. One theoretical version incorporated the environment found within Central Asian 
States (CAS). The other developed a structure for the COIN player to use Chinese tactics 
and operations. We developed these to provide a more focused environment for players 
dependent upon their current and future operations. Additionally, we believe that other 
variants of the game can be produced that focus on other regions across the globe, so long 
as a detailed study of that environment is created then applied to the game mechanics within 




Our main purpose for this wargame is to create an educational enhancement tool for 
entry-level SOF operators, with a secondary audience of SOF support personnel, to gain an 
understanding of these concepts, better preparing them to execute within the operational force. 
Rebels and States is designed to teach the doctrinal and theoretical aspects of COIN and 
insurgency in line with the primary subjects taught at the SFQC. As a baseline, we developed 
the game to incorporate UW, COIN, and U.S. Army operational terms and graphics, ensuring 
that Rebels and States stayed in line with what is being instructed at the SFQC. Once these 
were identified, we utilized a Data Collection and Management Plan (DCMP) matrix to 
analyze the two doctrines and six theorists. In doing so, we discovered five critical common 
subjects that were developed as part as the baseline game as well. This chapter intends to 
define the UW and COIN fundamentals incorporated into the game, identify operational terms 
and graphics that are also found within gameplay, and highlight the additional five subjects 
we designed into the game that resulted in our baseline or simplest version of Rebels and 
States.  
A. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE  
The purpose of this wargame is to provide the audience with an educational 
experience that reinforces basic doctrinal understandings of insurgencies, resistance, UW, and 
COIN. As displayed in Figure 1, Chapter I, these mission sets find themselves on opposing 
side of the irregular warfare (IR) spectrum, resulting in a logical choice for the foundational 
focus of this wargame.  
1. Unconventional Warfare Overview 
UW is defined as “operations and activities that are conducted to enable a resistance 
movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power 
by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied 
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area.”15 This option can be conducted within the realm of major, high intensity conflict, such 
as World War II, or during smaller, limited wars, such as in the initial invasion of Afghanistan 
in late 2001. Regardless of the scope of the conflict, UW is conducted by small SOF teams 
who specialize in conducting operations in a denied area with limited resources. Once selected 
as the option moving forward, SOF teams turn their attention to the organization, training, and 
employment of resistance forces and insurgencies to achieve the strategic objective of 
weakening, if not dismantling, a foreign government or power. 
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has established that 
USASOC is the lead component for UW.16 In turn, USASOC has established that UW is the 
“core task and organizing principle for Army SF.”17 It is here that USSF finds its foundational 
purpose as UW serves as the overarching, driving mission set, while all other skills sets are 
complimentary. The continuous study of UW is critical to the success of USSF soldiers, but 
a basic understanding must be established. Once the foundational and doctrinal understanding 
of UW is achieved, then its application to the present and future environments can be ever 
more effective. 
2. Components of a Resistance or Insurgency 
A resistance or insurgency has three components: guerrillas, auxiliary, and 
underground.18 Each component plays a critical role to the overall effort of overthrowing an 
occupying government or power, and the actions of each must be synchronized to support the 
other. USSF must take time to understand and advise these components and avoid strictly 
focusing on combat operations. Given that this is the basic infrastructure of an insurgency, 
these three components became the baseline pieces for Rebels and States.  
 
15 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, JP3-05 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), 
GL-12, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_05.pdf. 
16 USASOC, Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide, 4. 
17 Department of the Army, Special Forces Operations, FM 3-18 (Washington, DC: Department of 
the Army, 2014), 3–4, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_c/pdf/web/fm3_18.pdf. 
18 USASOC, Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide, 7–8. 
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(1) Guerrillas or Guerrilla Force 
The guerrilla force is a “group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel 
organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, 
hostile, or denied territory.”19 It is the military arm of the resistance or insurgency, charged 
with conducting kinetic operations against their enemy. It also serves as the most overt 
component the organization. They are motivated by the ideals and endstate of the organization 
at large, and are not considered mercenaries or illegal gangs, both of which are motivated by 
profiting from a conflict.20 Generally, they are the last component of a resistance or 
insurgency that initiates its activities. 
(2) Auxiliary 
The auxiliary is a “portion of the population that provides active clandestine support 
to the guerrilla force or the underground.”21 It serves as the support functions necessary to 
maintain the resistance or insurgency. Many of its members are normal citizens who serve 
part-time as the support network, but are not overt in their sympathies, providing critical 
functions such as logistics, labor, and intelligence.22 Through its ability to hide in plain sight, 
the auxiliary can overtly operate, allowing the guerrillas to stay hidden until necessary and the 
underground to remain covert. 
(3) Underground 
The underground is a “cellular organization within the resistance that has the ability 
to conduct operations in areas that are inaccessible to guerrillas, such as urban areas under the 
control of local security force.”23 It responsible for “subversion, sabotage, intelligence 
collection, and other compartmentalized activities.”24 Ultimately, it directs many of the 
 
19 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, GL-7. 
20 USASOC, Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide, 8. 
21 USASOC, 7. 
22 Department of the Army, Special Forces Operations, 3–6. 
23 USASOC, Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide, 7. 
24 Department of the Army, Special Forces Operations, 3–6. 
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actions of the resistance or insurgency, and much of the overall leadership falls within the 
underground. Although the underground and auxiliary are two separate entities, many of the 
members of the underground serve as leadership or directors of the functions of the auxiliary. 
B. COUNTERINSURGENCY 
COIN is “a comprehensive civilian and military effort designed to simultaneously 
defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.”25 This is not a military-only 
approach. A coordinated effort between the military and civil agencies and organizations is 
required to successfully conduct COIN. The U.S. can find itself conducting COIN in one of 
two ways: intervening on the behalf of another government, such as during the Salvadorian 
Civil War, or after major combat operations as the U.S.-backed established government faces 
an insurgency, such as in Iraq.26 Regardless, a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and 
multinational (JIIM) effort is critical to success. 
Above all other things, COIN represents the struggle between the established 
government or power and a resistance or insurgency over the legitimacy of being a ruling 
power. This legitimacy is ultimately determined by the population. COIN efforts must 
combine security, information, and stability operations while seeking to determine and satisfy 
the grievances of a disgruntled portion of a population. Such grievances can include the 
imbalance of political, economic, or social power, as well as ideological, religious, and social 
differences. Normally, a combination of these grievances creates a disgruntled population, 
one that a resistance or insurgency looks to use and exploit to pursue their own goals. This 
wide variety of potential issues displays the importance of a combined military and civil 
approach to have successful COIN operations. Without the expertise of the military to find, 
fix, and finish the insurgency, civilian organizations risk the population’s and their own 
security. Furthermore, militaries inherently have strong logistical and support infrastructures 
that can aid civilian efforts. Conversely, without civilian expertise in the establishment of 
governments, militaries can find themselves failing to consolidate hard earned gains. 
 
25 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterinsurgency, JP 3-24 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), 
GL-5, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_24.pdf. 
26 Joint Chiefs of Staff, I–1. 
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1. Foundations of COIN 
At its core, COIN must be approached proactively and integrate all instruments of 
national power—Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economy, Financial, Intelligence, and 
Law Enforcement (DIMEFIL)—as well as integrate the full power, authority, and financial 
resources of various departments and organizations, including those of third-party nations.27 
DIMEFIL provides a COIN force with numerous options to address the grievances of a 
population, as it is normally the struggle over who controls these instruments that provides 
some sort of power or legitimacy over the population.28 Ultimately, this equates into political 
power and control of a population, region, or state. An analysis of DIMEFIL provides a 
framework when analyzing the solution to a resistance or insurgency. 
The main goals of COIN are to attack the insurgent, establish control of the 
population, regain control of insurgent-held areas, and conduct information operations to 
bolster the counterinsurgent’s effort while discrediting the resistance or insurgent.29 All of 
these actions are in an effort to regain the confidence of the population as the legitimate 
governing power in an area. While the physical terrain of this battlespace can be well-defined, 
it takes a far more concerted effort to measure gains within the human terrain, where more 
efforts must be focused. 
The struggle between the resistance or insurgent and the counterinsurgent may lead to 
a destabilization of the border area, resulting in the intervention of third-party nations. Just as 
the case is with UW, outside support and aid is key to successful COIN. We identified this as 
a critical aspect of COIN and incorporated the importance of external actors through the 
border countries on the game board. 
A Line of Effort is “a line that links multiple tasks and mission using the logic of 
purpose—cause and effect—to focus toward establishing operational and strategic 
 
27 Department of the Army, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24.2 (Washington, DC: Department 
of the Army, 2009), 3–1, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/fm3_24x2.pdf. 
28 SGM(R) Joe Wilkerson, “Ends, Ways, and Means of Irregular Warfare” (Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 
April 26, 2020), https://us-lti.bbcollab.com/collab/ui/session/playback. 
29 Department of the Army, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, 3–1-3–2. 
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conditions”.30 LOEs serve as a series of overarching themes, or sub-goals, to reach an 
endstate. The doctrinal LOEs for COIN are: 1) establish civil security, 2) support to host 
nation security forces, 3) support to governance, 4) restore essential services, 5) support to 
economic and infrastructure development, and 6) conduct information engagement.31 Each 
LOE addresses a portion of the population that is pro-resistance, pro-government, or neutral 
to increase the overall support and legitimacy of the government. These LOEs aided us in 
identifying the pieces for the COIN player. Just as the UW player had three different types of 
pieces (guerrillas, auxiliary, underground), the COIN player had three pieces as well: security 
forces, essential services, and local government. The roles of these pieces are defined in 
Chapters III and IV. 
2. Direct Counterinsurgency 
Within U.S. Army doctrine, there are two predominant methods in countering 
resistances or insurgencies: indirectly and directly. Indirect methods “seek to support existing 
governments, security forces, and groups through increasing capacity to counter an 
insurgency and enabling existing activities” and is employed when resources are constrained 
and issues do not significantly impacts the interests of the US.32 Direct methods are the most 
resource intensive and are required to support the COIN effort.33 They follow a “Shape-Clear-
Hold-Build-Transition Framework” designed to have a continued hands on and emphatic 
approach.34 This framework aims to determine where best to apply resources, remove 
resistances or insurgencies from the area, maintain the security in the area, rebuild the security, 
infrastructure, and governance apparatuses, then hand all responsibilities back to the host 
nation. Other direct methods can be targeting threat infrastructure, or possibly the component 
of a resistance or insurgency, and conducting strike operations in resistance or insurgent held 
 
30 Department of the Army, 3–7. 
31 Department of the Army, 3–8. 
32 Department of the Army, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, FM 3-24 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 2014), 10–11, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/
fm3_24.pdf. 
33 Department of the Army, 9–1. 
34 Department of the Army, 9–1. 
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locations.35 Regardless of the option, direct approaches take far more time, effort, and 
resources to achieve its goals. We only incorporated direct COIN methods into the game 
because of its straightforward methodology and simplicity when translating into the rules; 
indirect COIN methods include larger plans and operations that fall outside the scope of the 
game. 
C. ENVIRONMENT CONSIDERATIONS  
The modern-day operating environment is ever changing and complex. Rarely are any 
two scenarios exactly the same, forcing SOF operators, leaders, and their staffs to have the 
ability to think dynamically and anticipate many different potential outcomes, as opposed to 
a linear thought process that expects situations to play out as it has in the past. This creates a 
very difficult scenario to create in live training, much less in digital or analog wargames. Yet, 
the ability to create numerous, ever changing scenarios without resulting in overwhelmingly 
complicated details and constraints results in a valuable training aid. Furthermore, providing 
this scenario will serve as an effective means to allow players to test and assess their own 
thought processes, their comprehension of strategies and theories, and their understanding and 
comprehension of an opponent and an environment without ever replicating the same 
scenario.  
Given this, we sought to create an environment where a player would have to conduct 
terrain analysis and consider human factors. Terrain analysis is the “collection, analysis, 
evaluation, and interpretation of the natural and man-made features of the terrain, combined 
with other relevant features, to predict the effect of the terrain on military operations.”36 
Human factors are “the physical, cultural, psychological, and behavioral attributes of an 
individual or group that influence perceptions, understanding, and interactions.”37 This drove 
us to analyze how to create a game board that captured different types of terrain, populations, 
and human and societal dynamics that could change each iteration and would force the players 
 
35 Department of the Army, 9–12-9–14. 
36 Department of the Army, Operational Terms, FM 1-02 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 
2019), 1–104, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN19780_FM%201-02x1%20-
%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf. 
37 Department of the Army, 1–51. 
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to analyze their environment before selecting a strategy. Consequently, we created three 
aspects of a physical environment and five aspects for human and societal environments for 
Rebels and States.  
The three physical environment aspects that we incorporated are terrain, borders, and 
population. Terrain incorporates an understanding of how different types of terrain have 
effects on a military operation. To reinforce the influence of outside or international actors 
within a conflict, borders were created. We focused on borders of external countries that were 
either COIN friendly, insurgent friendly, or neutral. Finally, we considered population as the 
number of citizens found within an area that provide recruits to either side. Furthermore, given 
the population decides the legitimacy of each side, we implemented this aspect as well. 
Chapter III provides a further explanation of how these are incorporated into the game. 
To capture the human and societal factors, we looked at different operational 
variables, which are a “comprehensive set of informational categories used to describe an 
operational environment.”38 Normally, these are categorized as the following: Political, 
Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time 
(PMESII-PT).39 While comprehensive in their categories, we determined that incorporating 
each operational variable into Rebels and States would result in overly complicated functions. 
To prevent this, we combined these variables into the following: Social (social), Economy 
(economic and infrastructure), Politics (political), Media (information), and Military 
(military). The physical environment is captures by other game mechanisms, described in 
Chapter III. We then determined to give each of our variables, which we named environment 
cards, three different effects: one that assists the counterinsurgent, one that assists the 
insurgent, and one that applies no advantage. 
D. DATA COLLECTION AND MANAGEMENT PLAN (DCMP) 
Knowing that we wanted to introduce the two doctrines and six theorists taught in the 
SFQC, we found it critical to go beyond incorporating only doctrinal aspects into the baseline 
 
38 Department of the Army, 1–77. 
39 Department of the Army, 2–17. 
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version of the game. Therefore, we conducted an analysis into the commonalities across all 
eight strategies. For this analysis we utilized a DCMP matrix. The DCMP “is fundamental to 
analytical wargames…it will dictate aspects of the scenario and the activities to be 
wargamed.”40 This matrix serves as a means to identify key issues that the game is designed 
to answer, break them down into sub-issues, translates the issues into questions that game 
design and functions and scenario injects can answer, then record player decisions and results. 
During the development of an analytical wargame, the DCMP not only reinforces critical 
facets but also serves to collect information on player performance and decisions. But, given 
that Rebels and States serves as an educational tool, we used the DCMP to highlight points 
that must be reinforced across all doctrine and theorists which we then translated into basic 
functions of gameplay. By using the DCMP to highlight then breakdown issues within each 
strategy, we found common themes and trends that were translated into scenario and game 
mechanics. 
Across the chosen doctrine and theorists, the most common subjects we identified 
were information and media, control of the population, recruitment, effectiveness of 
government, and intelligence. Information and media focused on how an internal or external 
population see the struggle or conflict, ultimately effecting the legitimacy of the insurgency 
or counterinsurgency. Control of the population is centered on the ability for either side to 
gain support of the population. Recruitment is purely one side or the other’s ability to have 
the population join their cause or ranks. Effectiveness of government is the basis of many 
insurgent/counterinsurgent struggles and is centered on the ability of the government to meet 
the needs and address the grievances of the population. Finally, intelligence is key because of 
its wide range of abilities to discover and enemy’s intentions, conduct operations to deceive 
the enemy, and prevent enemy intelligence activities. Once identified, we applied these 
common aspects through different game functions. 
  
 
40 Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Defence Wargaming Handbook, 28. 
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III. REBELS AND STATES DESIGN  
Rebels and States is designed to be played within 30 minutes to an hour. This ensures 
that players remain engaged in the game without it affecting other aspects of their daily lives 
and prevents other distractions from taking away from the educational experience. Our design 
and development methodology began with applying our previous wargame development 
experience and analyzing other games to design a game board that would replicate a complex 
operating environment. The result of this process is a two player, or two-sided, wargame that 
pits the insurgent versus the counterinsurgent. Rebels and States requires the players to 
constantly analyze the environment in which they are playing, determine the strengths and 
weaknesses in their own and their opponent’s strategies, and attempt to meet the winning 
conditions. The alternating turns during game play allows for players to anticipate and react to 
their opponent. Ultimately, the game ends once a player gains the required amount of 
legitimacy points. The remainder of this chapter describes the initial design, playtesting 
process, and final design of Rebels and States. 
A. ANALYSIS  
While conducting analysis of other wargames and board games, we relied heavily on 
our own past experience. We previously, played, analyzed, and produced sponsored analytical 
wargames, all of which focused on gaining influence within different regions of the world. We 
also played and critiqued other board games for functionality, mechanics, and design. This 
analysis aided us in developing the initial rule set, board design, and game pieces, and 
mechanics.  
Mainly, we had two focuses when analyzing other board games: create a game board 
that could change each time the game is played; and allow players to directly and indirectly 
interact with one another. The analysis of Settlers of Catan provided a basis for game board 
design. This game uses hexagonal game spaces with specific types of resources that are 
changed from game to game.41 Our analysis determined that hexagons allow for pieces to fit 
 
41 “Board Games | Catan.Com,” Settlers of Catan, 2020, https://www.catan.com/board-games. 
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together and provide movement to each side, without confusion for movement across the 
apexes (diagonals for square pieces). Furthermore, the different resources on the hexes could 
be replaced by different types of terrain. This analysis provided us with solutions to our goal 
of a constantly changing game board and the use of terrain.  
We borrowed from Risk and its simple engagement method. Engagements in Risk 
follows a simple dice roll methodology where an attacker roles dice against a defender, the 
highest dice from each side are matched against the other side, adjudication is made, and ties 
go to the defender.42 This function provided us a simple means to adjudicate engagements, 
providing us a solution to quick gameplay and staying within the desired time limits. 
B. INITIAL DESIGN  
Keeping in mind the learning objectives that we established, the initial design for 
Rebels and States had four distinct and critical parts: game board, game pieces, definitions, and 
rules. Game design went through three phases; these phases coincided with a series of playtests. 
Overall, we aimed to keep the players engaged throughout the game so that they could play as 
the different strategists while reinforcing other lessons such as terrain analysis and 
understanding human factors. We also wanted to reinforce certain U.S. military doctrinal terms 
and definitions, which were incorporated in either the name and function of game pieces or in 
our definitions. Finally, game rules were critical. Initially, our focus was to merely facilitate a 
functioning game. But as the process progressed, we modified rules and turned our efforts to 
ensure the bonuses applied to the strategies coincided with their creators’ purpose, within the 
context of the game.  
The initial game board attempted to capture all aspects we identified during the 
analysis. The purpose was to secure enough spaces to gain legitimacy points, which would end 
the game. The gameboard went through several iterations but never lost our original intent of 
incorporating terrain and human factors. For some playtests, we used a printed game board that 
had fixed hexes while other times we re-purposed the hexes from Settlers of Catan to rearrange 
 




the game board. We also had a number of population markers that would be distributed across 
the board in different hexes.  
In the initial version of the board, the colors were associated with a certain type of 
terrain, as displayed in Figure 2. Unrestricted terrain is terrain that does not hinder any 
movement, which is represented by the tan desert and light green plains.43 Restricted terrain 
slightly affects movement, which is represented by the dark green forests.44 Severely restricted 
terrain significantly affects the movement of forces, which is represented by the gray 
mountains.45 We also included water, displayed in blue, which was impassible. The initial 
board had four types of borders: Insurgent Friendly, Neutral, Counterinsurgent Friendly, and 
International Waters. Each of these were associated with certain strategies. We placed markers 
ranging from 1–6, to represent the population in each space. Figure 3 is an example of how we 
incorporated human factors to the start of each game. We used the five factors we identified 
during analysis (Social, Economy, Politics, Media, and Military) and applied certain bonuses.  
 
Figure 2. Original Game Board Design  
 
43 Department of the Army, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, ATP 2-01.3 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 2019), 4–13, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/
ARN20395_ATP%202-01x3%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf. 
44 Department of the Army, 4–13. 




Figure 3. Examples of Environment Cards  
Once this was established, the players selected either the insurgent or COIN 
strategy, gathered an initial set of forces, then distributed them throughout the game board. 
The forces were broken into four distinct categories: fighters, support, intelligence, and 
HQs. Again, we wanted to reinforce certain doctrine with these forces. For the insurgent 
player, the fighters became guerrillas, the support became auxiliary, and the HQs became 
the underground.46 For the counterinsurgent player, the fighters were security forces, the 
support was essential services, and the HQs was local government.47 Intelligence stayed 
the same on both sides. Simply put, fighters conducted engagements and secured hexes, 
support provided the ability to recruit, intelligence destroyed enemy support and HQs, and 
HQs provided legitimacy points. Figure 4 displays each player’s process during gameplay. 
The players alternated turns between the five phases until one met the requirement amount 
of legitimacy points. 
 
46 USASOC, Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide, 7–8. 




Figure 4. Initial Game Process  
Upon completion of the game design, we produced rules and definitions that 
facilitated the functions of game play. This included the rules and bonuses applied to the 
strategies and the respective aspects that we identified during analysis. Once our initial 
design was complete, we began a series of playtests to adjust and improve Rebels and 
States. 
C. PLAYTESTING AND FINAL DESIGN 
The playtests provided extremely valuable feedback that enabled us to develop a 
functioning wargame that meets our objectives. Throughout the process, two complete 
revisions of the game occurred before we developed our final version. The following 
sections describe the final version of Rebels and States and our process of developing the 
game board and pieces. Chapter IV will describe how to play the game, provide key 
definitions, and display game functions. 
1. Playtesting 
Playtests are designed to test all aspects of the wargame, with a concerted focus to 
essentially break the game, which would in turn allow for modification, improvements, and 
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enhancements to be made. The playtesting conducted for Rebels and States was 
deliberately conducted in three phases: Phase 1 focused on game mechanics; Phase 2 
focused on game improvements; and Phase 3 focused on game strategy. We used a 
combination of regular playtests, which were conducted by us, and blind playtests, which 
were conducted by volunteers who had not played the game. During the blind playtests, we 
utilized mid-career SOF officers with experience in the subject matter or in the production 
of wargames. Ideally, these individuals had experience in both. We applied the major 
subjects recommended by Peter Perla to develop our post-play questionnaire to receive 
feedback. These subjects are: Preparation, Structure and Style, Play, and Attitudes.48 
Appendix C provides the questionnaire we utilized post-playtesting. 
The first phase of playtesting focused on game mechanics, functions, and 
playability. A total of four playtests, three of which were blind, were conducted. Primarily 
the results of these playtests were adjustments to the rules and game board. The majority 
of feedback discussed the different uses of the fighters, supports, and HQ elements of the 
game. Figure 5 displays the first playtest conducted. 
 
Figure 5. Blind Playtest #1  
 
48 Perla and Curry, Peter Perla’s the Art of Wargaming, 307. 
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The second phase of playtesting focused less on game mechanics and more on the 
bonuses associated with each doctrine or theorist. A total of seven playtests, three of which 
were blind, were conducted in this phase. These playtests focused on initial impressions 
and complexities of the game and adjusting confusing or erroneous verbiage within the rule 
set. One blind playtest was conducted with two players from the first phase of playtesting. 
These players provided feedback on game adjustments and the effectiveness of bonuses 
associated with doctrine and theorists. The other four non-blind playtests were conducted 
by us to ensure the game continued to meet the original objectives, clarify rules, and adjust 
bonuses as required. Figure 6 displays a playtest in the second phase. 
 
Figure 6. Blind Playtest #4  
The third phase of playtesting focused on game play and the ability to meet the 
objectives of the developers. A total of four playtests, two of which were blind, were 
conducted in this phase. Two playtests involved players who had played during previous 
versions. The results of this series were small refinements within the strategies themselves, 
such as the implementation of additional winning conditions. 
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2. Final Design 
The Rebels and States game board is actually a series of hexes and border pieces 
that are combined and changed between iterations to make one, larger hexagon. It has three 
different parts: terrain hexes, border pieces, and population markers. The combination of 
these three parts, plus the use of the environment cards, results in nearly 100,000 different 
starting conditions for the game, meeting our intent of have a game that constantly changes 
its environment. Figure 7 displays the final version of the game board. 
 
Figure 7. Graphical Representation of Rebels and States Game Board  
After multiple playtests we determined to maintain the doctrinal terms for terrain. 
The only modification we made was to add graphics that reinforced doctrine. This means 
that unrestricted terrain has no graphics, restricted terrain has diagonal lines, and severely 
restricted terrain has crossed lines, the same graphics that are used when producing a 
Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO) during the military planning process.49 
Plains and desert are unrestricted and represented in green and tan respectively, forest is 
restricted and represented in dark green, mountains are severely restricted and represented 
in gray, and water remained impassible and represented in light blue. These hexes are 
represented in Figure 8. 
 




Figure 8. Terrain Hexes  
There are still four different types of borders, but we adjusted them to be 
interchangeable around the six different sides of the hexagon made by the smaller hexes. 
The three types of borders are international waters, insurgent friendly country, 
counterinsurgent friendly country, and neutral country. The borders still only provide 
bonuses to certain strategies. Figure 9 displays these different types of borders. 
 
Figure 9. Border Pieces  
The population markers largely remained the same from the initial design, with the 
exception that we added populations of zero to the board. These were added once the 
number of hexes was increased from 30 to 37. The populations are broken down into three 
types: Urban (5-6), Suburban (3-4), and Rural (1-2). Population is marked by small, 




The environment cards remained for the final version of Rebels and States. The 
only modification was to add the bonuses that either side received at the beginning of the 
game. Figure 10 displays the final version of the cards. 
 
Figure 10. Example Environment Cards  
One significant subject of feedback was the complicated nature of using 
intelligence. Therefore, we redesigned the game and produced DIMEFIL cards, as 
displayed in Figure 11, that serve multiple roles. They are predominantly used to destroy 
enemy support and HQ functions but can also move forces around the battlefield and attack 
fighters. 
 
Figure 11. Example DIMEFIL Cards 
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Based on the feedback from playtesting, we developed a smartcard which provided 
quick reference of key terms, definitions, and functions. Figure 12 displays the smartcard. 
 
Figure 12. Rebels and States Smart Card  
4. Pieces 
We simplified the game pieces for each side by creating color variations of the same 
design for fighters, support, and HQs. The insurgent would have red and the 
counterinsurgent blue. Due to some game mechanics, the support pieces had to be 
stackable, to show the aggregation of support, and reversible, to show if they were active 
or inactive. Furthermore, to prevent an overwhelming number of pieces on the board, we 





Figure 13. Game Pieces: HQs, Active Support, Inactive Support, One Fighter, 
and Five Fighters  
D. CONCLUSION 
The iterative design and development process resulted in a simpler and more 
streamlined version of Rebels and States rooted in doctrine and complex enough to force 
analysis of actions. The process involved numerous adjustments to the basic version, which 
omits the use of strategies, and the advanced version, which is when the strategies from the 
SFQC are introduced. The following chapter provides instruction on how to play the basic 
version of the game. Once this is understood and conceptualized, strategies can be 





IV. OVERVIEW AND WALKTHROUGH 
This chapter serves as an explanation the basic version of the game and is structured 
to describe the game board, how to play, game definitions, and general game rules. The 
information provided in this chapter also serves as the basis for the rules packet that is 
provided to players. 
A. SETUP AND PLAY  
The following sections describes how to establish the game board, general flow of 
the game, and how to win. 
1. How to Set Up Rebels and States 
The game board is designed to have 37 hexagonal pieces that fit together, making 
a larger hexagon. To create the board, the players place a random hexagonal piece in the 
center of a table, then place additional spaces in an outward clockwise spiral. The 
population markers numbered 1 through 6 are randomly placed each hex to indicate the 
density of population where 6 is the highest population density and 1 is the lowest 
population density. There are seven different population markers, ranging from 0. The total 
number of population markers are as follows: one 6, two 5s, three 4s, four 3s, six 2s, eight 
1s, and six 0s. To apply the population markers, players start at the center terrain space and 
place the markers in an outward counter-clockwise manner, ensuring that every space, 
except water, has a population. 
Then, the different border pieces are randomly applied. There are a total of six 
border pieces, representing insurgent and counterinsurgent friendly countries, neutral 
countries, and international water. To apply the borders, players will place the border 
pieces with the side indicating the type of terrain face down around the border aligning 
with the apexes of the game board. Once all are in place, the players will flip them over to 
reveal the types and locations of the borders. 
Finally, the environment cards are selected. The players will separate the cards into 
their respective stacks, then randomly choose once from each. The cards have bonuses that 
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apply to the beginning of the game during the initial array of forces, except for the Security 
Forces cards, which only apply to the first three engagements. Once the cards’ bonuses 
have been applied, they can be removed from the game board. 
2. How to Play Rebels and States 
Once the board has been established and the environment cards have been chosen, 
players then analyze the game board. Simultaneously they also consider which strategy 
best fits the environment they see on the board. Questions that the players should be trying 
to answer during their analysis are: 
• What is the state of the physical and human environment based on the way 
the terrain, population, and borders are distributed? 
• What is critical to the environment? 
• What is going to give me an advantage? 
• What is going to give my opponent an advantage? 
• What are my disadvantages? 
• How can a strategy provide me immediate and long-term advantages? 
After analyzing the game board, the players can select a strategy. Once players 
select their strategy, they collect and convert their initial recruitment points plus any 
additional bonuses from the environment cards. The counterinsurgent followed by the 
insurgent then initially array their forces. Following the initial array of forces, Rebels and 
States follows six different phases during game play. The first turn is initiated by the 
insurgent. A player will go through all five phases before their turn is complete. Figure 14 




Figure 14. Rebels and States Gameplay Flowchart  
3. How to Win Rebels and States 
Players can win Rebels and States in one direct and two indirect ways. Ultimately, 
Rebels and States is a struggle over legitimacy within the fictional environment. Players 
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are attempting to win directly by attaining 15 legitimacy points which is indicated in the 
legitimacy slider. Additionally, players have additional winning conditions they must meet 
to win the game, which will be described in Chapter V. Both the number of legitimacy 
points and the winning conditions can be adjusted at the beginning of the game to meet the 
intent of the organization that is playing the wargame. Organizations might wish to increase 
the required legitimacy points and win conditions to allow the game to replicate a 
protracted conflict where additional requirements for victory are necessary to pacify a 
specific region. In contrast, they can reduce the necessary legitimacy points in order to 
simulate a restrictive timeline that is often placed on operations by policy makers.  
The indirect ways to win the game involve preventing the other player from gaining 
recruitment points. The first way is to eliminate all opponent fighters from the board, 
therefore preventing their ability to secure any location. The second way is to eliminate all 
support and HQ pieces, preventing their ability to generate recruitment points. These 
indirect ways may not immediately provide victory, but the attrition of forces and inability 
for the opposing player to gain recruitment points eventually will lead to the end of the 
game. Furthermore, the opposing player’s strategy must not allow them to generate any 
additional recruitment points or forces during their turn. The indirect ways of winning are 
rare and difficult to achieve. 
B. DEFINITIONS 
Throughout development and playtesting, definitions did not change significantly. 
While some terms were given additional information, the majority of modifications were 
made for clarification. The following section describes the key terms that are crucial to the 
wargame. 
1. Generic Definitions 
Defining fundamental terms is a critical initial step to understanding the wargame 
as it ensures that players have a common understanding of how the game functions.  
Attack: When at least one Guerrilla Fighter or Security Force engages a hostile 
force by rolling attack dice  
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Control: Established when an Underground/Local Government is established 
within a space.  
DIMEFIL: Instruments of National Power; Diplomatic, Information, Military, 
Economic, Financial, Intelligence, Law Enforcement.  
Dormant: When an Auxiliary/Essential Service or Underground/Local 
Government remains in a space that is occupied by opposing Guerrilla 
Fighters/Security Forces that are equal to or greater than the population in 
that space. Dormant forces do not allow you to gain recruitment points but 
do not lose legitimacy points.  
Engagement:  Sum of all attacks conducted by Guerrilla Fighters or Security 
Forces from any one space. An engagement can consist of any number of 
attacks as long as the attacking force has the necessary forces  
Established: When an Underground/Local Government/Essential Service is placed 
inside a space and can no longer move. An Auxiliary is established when it 
is activated in the consolidation phase in order to receive recruitment points 
in subsequent turns.  
Forces: Consist of any of Insurgent and Counterinsurgent pieces including 
Underground, Intelligence, Auxiliary, Guerrilla Fighters, Local 
Government, Essential Services, Security Forces.  
Friendly Space: Any space containing friendly forces.  
Fully Supported Space: Any friendly space that has three Auxiliary/Essential 
Services more than any hostile Auxiliary/Essential Services.  
Hostile Space: Any space that contains forces of the opposing player.  
Legitimacy Points: Points generated when an Underground/Local Government are 
established in a space. Once an Underground/Local Government control a 
space, they receive legitimacy points equivalent to the population in that 




Neutral Space: Any space on the board that is not occupied by forces from either 
the Insurgent or Counterinsurgent.  
Occupy: When any Insurgent or Counterinsurgent forces are present in any one 
space.  
Population: The single number (1 through 6) present in each space denotes the 
amount of people in any given location. 1 represents the lowest population 
and 6 represents the highest population.  
Recruitment Points: Points acquired during the deployment phase that allow 
either player to acquire additional forces and are generated by totaling the 
number of population spaces that are supported, fully supported, or 
controlled by either Auxiliary/Essential Services.  
Restricted Terrain: Requires forces to pay one movement point in the movement 
phase to move through this space.  
Rural Space: Any space with a population of one or two.  
Severely Restricted Terrain: Requires forces to pay two movement points in the 
movement phase to move through this space.  
Suburban Space: Any space with a population of three or four.  
Support: Achieved when either player has at least one Auxiliary/Essential Services 
in any single space while accompanied by Guerrilla Fighters/Security 
Forces equal to the population in that space or an Underground/Local 
Government present in the space. If opposing Auxiliary/Essential Services 
are present, the player with most Auxiliary/Essential Services in that space 
has achieved support for that space.  
Unrestricted Terrain: Forces pay no movement point in the movement phase to 
move through this space.  
Urban Terrain: Any space with a population of five or six.  
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2. Insurgent-Specific Definitions 
Auxiliary: Generates additional forces by allowing the player to create recruitment 
points equal to the population in that space. Must be present in a space for 
one full turn before the player can generate additional recruitment points. 
Allows for the player to deploy newly recruited forces into spaces that have 
Auxiliary present. Auxiliary can move into spaces with hostile forces. 
Allows for the player to move forces from one space into another position 
containing Auxiliary in the consolidation phase. Cost—2 recruitment 
points.  
DIMEFIL Card: Allows a player to remove opposing Forces or maneuver forces 
for a dynamic strike. Player may recruit only one DIMEFIL card per turn. 
Player may use one DIMEFIL Card per turn in their engagement phase. 
Player may only maintain 5 DIMEFIL Cards per turn. Cost—3 recruitment 
points.  
Guerrilla Fighters: Allows a player to engage opposing Security Forces in order 
to secure a neutral or enemy space. Spaces are secure when the number of 
Guerrilla Fighters equals the population size the space which the occupy. 
Cost—1 recruitment point.  
Underground: Allows the player to control space, generates legitimacy points, and 
generate recruitment points equal to the population in that space. 
Underground can only be established in spaces that are fully supported. 
Underground cannot move once established. Cost—4 recruitment points  
3. Counterinsurgent-Specific Definitions 
DIMEFIL Card: Allows a player to remove opposing Forces. Player may recruit 
only one intelligence card per turn. Player may use one DIMEFIL Card per 
turn in their engagement phase. Player may only maintain 5 DIMEFIL 
Cards per turn. Cost—3 recruitment points.  
 
40 
Essential Services: Generates additional forces by allowing the player to create 
recruitment points equal to the population in that space. Allows for the 
player to deploy newly recruited forces into spaces that hold Essential 
Services. Allows for the player to move forces from one space into another 
position containing Essential Services in the consolidation phase. Essential 
Services cannot move once established. Essential Services can only be 
established in a space that has been secured by Security Forces for one 
previous turn. Cost—2 recruitment points.  
Local Government: Control space and generates legitimacy and recruitment 
points equal to the population in that space. Local Government can only be 
established in spaces that are fully supported. Local Government cannot 
move once established. Cost—4 recruitment points. 
Security Forces: Allows a player to engage opposing Guerrilla forces in order to 
secure a neutral or enemy space. Must occupy a space for one full turn with 
Security Forces equal to the population in order establish Essential Services. 
Cost—1 recruitment point.  
C. ARRAY FORCES 
Before the first turn can begin, the players have to establish their initial positions 
on the board. The counterinsurgent arrays their forces first. This simulates the fact that the 
counterinsurgent government often has forces that are established and organized within the 
country prior to any insurgent campaign. The insurgent can assess where government 
forces are and then array their forces which gives the inherent initiative to the insurgent, 
which is often the case in the initial stages of an insurgent campaign.  
Both players begin with 10 recruitment points plus any bonuses from the 
environment cards. Both players select forces from the allotment of recruitment points. The 
insurgent will place their forces on the board first, followed by the counterinsurgent.  
Among the varying population and terrain locations that players can choose from, 
there are two distinct rules that apply for the first turn: 
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1. The insurgent cannot occupy any space with a population of 3 or more. 
2. The counterinsurgent must secure at least one population space of 5 or 6. 
The insurgent was given the restriction of occupying only population spaces of 3 
or more to reflect the isolated nature of insurgencies during their initial phases. The 
counterinsurgent requirement reflects the nature of the government occupying the capital 
city and major population centers in the country.  
D. ORDER OF OPERATIONS 
The order of operations for each turn is broken down into six distinct phases that 
are repeated each turn. The players alternate turns where the insurgent will play all six 
phases, followed by the counterinsurgent, alternating until one player has achieved 15 
legitimacy points and their strategy win conditions. The order of operations is as follows: 
1. Determine aspects of strategy for employment this turn 
2. Recruitment Phase 
3. Deployment Phase 
4. Movement Phase 
5. Engagement phase 
6. Consolidation phase 
The insurgent and counterinsurgent have some advantages afforded in the 
recruitment, deployment, and movement phases to reflect the different tactical and 
operational capabilities inherent in either side.  
1. Determine Aspects for Employment This Turn 
During this phase, the players will select one aspect of the strategy that they have 
chosen. Players will clearly articulate the specific rules of the strategy that they are using 
for that turn to the other player. This ensures not only that the other player understands 
what rule that player is using, but it also reinforces in game learning where players discuss 
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the aspects of the strategy currently in play. The strategy specific rules and aspects are 
discussed in Chapter V.  
2. Recruitment Phase 
During the recruitment phase, players generate new forces equal to the number of 
population spaces that they support, fully support, or control. This phase ensures that there 
is a direct correlation between population influence and the amount of support either 
insurgent or counterinsurgent can receive. Players must continually assess how much of 
the population support they have to prepare for future turns. 
3. Deployment Phase 
During the Deployment Phase, forces may be placed in locations where support 
forces are established. Headquarters can only be established in fully supported spaces. 
Unused recruitment points are lost if not played in this turn. The deployment phase 
simulates the introduction of newly recruited forces onto the battlefield. Players must 
deploy forces in areas where they have either infrastructure or networks that are represented 
by support forces. This simulates the level of resources and effort required to move 
capabilities in and around the area of operations.  
4. Movement Phase 
The movement phase allows players to maneuver pieces, such as their fighters or 
support, through the simulated country while accounting for terrain and opposing forces. 
Players are restricted in movement by terrain which ultimately effects the distance (number 
of hexes in this case) that any particular force can travel per turn. Movement is restricted 
based on the physical terrain in each space. Any force has three movement points per player 
turn. First the player subtracts movements points based on the terrain in the space which 
the force is starting from (0 movement points for unrestricted terrain, 1 movement point 
for restricted terrain, 2 movement points for severely restricted terrain). Then the player 
pays one movement point to move into an adjacent space. Repeat the process of 1) 
assessing the terrain and 2) moving until the force is out of movement points. Figure 15 




Figure 15. Examples of the Movement Phase 
5. Engagement Phase 
The engagement phase was designed to reflect direct and indirect attacks that are 
common in insurgent warfare. The “attack” portion of the rules reflect direct force-on-force 
fighting between combatants. The “reconnaissance in force” rule (described in subsection 
b) was created to allow players to engage with the terrain if the opponent is using an 
avoidance strategy. The “withdrawal” rule (described in subsection c) was created to reflect 
the elusive nature and freedom of movement on both sides. 
During the Engagement Phase players engage from neutral or enemy spaces 
adjacent to spaces that contain enemy fighters. To engage a neutral space, move at least 
one fighter piece into the adjacent space. Players can play one and only one DIMEFIL card 
at any point in the engagement phase.  
Engagements by forces are restricted in their attack by the physical terrain they 
move through. Any force has three engagement points per player turn. First the player 
subtracts engagement points based on the terrain in the space which the force is starting 
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from (0 engagement points for unrestricted terrain, 1 engagement point for restricted 
terrain, 2 engagement points for severely restricted terrain). Then the player pays one 
engagement point to attack into an adjacent space and move any forces into that adjacent 
space if the defenders are eliminated. Repeat the process of 1) assessing the terrain and 2) 
attacking until the force is out of engagement points. Figure 16 displays multiple 
engagements. 
 
Figure 16. Example of Conducting Multiple Engagements  
a. Attack 
To engage a hostile space, the player may the roll red attack dice. If the insurgent 
has three or more fighters, they roll three red attack dice. If the insurgent is attacking with 
two fighters, they roll two red attack dice. If the insurgent is attacking with one fighter, 
they may only roll one red attack dice. If the defending insurgent player has two or more 
Fighters in the hex they are defending, they may roll two white defense dice. If the 
defending insurgent player has only one guerrilla force or security force in the space they 
are defending, they may only roll one white defense dice. Both players roll their allotted 
dice: the players will match up to two of their highest dice rolls. For each dice that has a 
 
45 
higher dice roll, remove one Guerrilla/Security Force. The defender wins any ties. Figure 
17 displays an example of an attack. 
 
Figure 17. Example of an Attack in the Engagement Phase 
b. Reconnaissance in Force 
A player can choose to use Guerrilla/Security Forces to engage an adjacent hostile 
space that does not have opposing Guerrilla/Security Forces but contains other hostile 
forces. The player can move any number of Guerrilla/Security Forces into that space; 
however, they must keep at least one Guerrilla/Security Forces in the original space from 
which the engagement was initiated. If the number of Guerrilla/Security Forces equal the 
population in that space, any hostile forces go dormant. This costs no engagement points 
and forces conducting this action can conduct no further engagements or actions this phase. 
This simulates opponent support or infrastructure in an area that has to go dormant because 
of the lack of security or fighters. As an example, if U.S. forces were to secure an area, 
driving out Taliban forces from a village, Taliban support networks would remain, 
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requiring the U.S. to maintain security force in the immediate vicinity to prevent a 
resurgence of insurgent activity. 
c. Withdraw 
The defending side can withdraw forces from one space prior to a hostile 
engagement. The withdrawing force can only move its forces into an adjacent friendly or 
neutral space. This comes at a cost of 25% of the recruitment points for the next turn. When 
determining the exact amount of recruitment points lost, conduct the required math then 
always round down. For example, 19 recruitment points x 0.25 = 4.75, rounding down 
equals only 4 recruitment points. Withdrawing ends the attacker’s engagement for that 
space, but they may still conduct a Reconnaissance in Force.  
6. Consolidation Phase 
The consolidation phase was designed to use operational level assets to adjust their 
array of forces and prepare for the opposing players turn. During insurgencies, forces are 
able to reconsolidate after major attacks or prepare for a future threat. The consolidation 
phase allows players to prepare and anticipate their opponent’s future moves.  
In this phase, players move Fighters from any one space containing Support to any 
other single space that also contains a Support in order to reposition those pieces for future 
attack or defense.  
E. INSURGENT SPECIFIC RULES 
In Rebels and States, the insurgent is given advantages in the game to reflect the 
secret and hidden nature of an insurgency. The auxiliary force in particular is given special 
abilities to move into enemy spaces in order to reflect the importance of establishing 
effective support networks.  
1. Recruitment Phase  
The insurgent generates new forces equal to the number of population spaces that 
they support, fully support, or control. The insurgent player must activate any auxiliaries 
in a space before they can recruit. Auxiliaries are activated in the consolidation phase of 
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the subsequent turn. For example, if an auxiliary move into a space on turn 2, the auxiliary 
is activated on the consolidation of turn 3, allowing the player to collect recruitment points 
during the recruitment phase of Phase 4 and every turn thereafter. 
2. Movement Phase  
Insurgent can move any guerrilla forces or auxiliary through adjacent spaces based 
on the terrain in each space. Auxiliary may move into spaces that do not have guerrilla 
fighters. 
F. COUNTERINSURGENT SPECIFIC RULES 
The counterinsurgent-specific rules are designed to reflect the clear, hold, build 
methodology that is employed in U.S. COIN doctrine. The player must use security forces 
to provide security in advance of putting in essential services. Essential services cannot 
move like the insurgent support function to reflect the notion that government-provided 
essential services include physical infrastructure.  
1. Recruitment Phase 
The counterinsurgent player generates new forces equal to the number of 
population spaces that they support, fully support, or control. The counterinsurgent must 
have Security Forces equal to or greater than the population in a space for one full turn 
before Essential Services can be established in a space. For example, if three Security 
Forces are moved into a space on turn 2, the Security Forces must remain in place and must 
be equal to or greater than population in that space for the entirety of turn 3 and an Essential 
Service must be established in that space during turn 3 in order to then recruit from that 
space during turn 4.  
2. Movement Phase 
The counterinsurgent can move any Security Forces through adjacent spaces based 
on the terrain in each space, as previously described. The counterinsurgent must place 
Security Forces equal to the population in a space for at least one turn before Essential 
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Services or Local Government can be established; doing so is considered having secured 
the population.  
G. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has covered the fundamental rules and gameplay for Rebels and States. 
Once players understand the basic rules and mechanics of the game, they incorporate the 
rules for UW and COIN strategists. First time players will use U.S. UW and COIN doctrine 
in order to understand the doctrinal methods. Once players understand U.S. doctrine, they 
can incorporate the other six UW and COIN strategists. The insurgents can also select 
either Mao Tse Tung, T.E. Lawrence, or The Cuban Revolution. The counterinsurgent 
selects either David Galula, Robert Thompson, or OEF-P Basilan model. Each strategy has 
advantages and disadvantages that reflect the way each strategy operates in an insurgent 
conflict. Each of these strategies and their game modifications will be explained in the 




V. REBELS AND STATES ADVANCED 
Once the basic version of Rebels and States was developed, we turned our attention 
to developing the advanced version. Keeping in line with our learning objectives, we 
conducted a thorough analysis, scoping, and modification of the fundamental dynamics from 
the two doctrines and six theories/theorists. We then developed modifiers to simplify these 
dynamics for gameplay because the details of a successful insurgency or counterinsurgency 
campaign can become so minute that they would prevent successful gameplay, resulting in 
a failed attempt for the players to understand concepts, or as the colloquial saying goes “miss 
the forest for the trees.” To prevent this, the major concepts and learning objectives for each 
strategy were extracted, then given a perceived advantage, or bonus, but still leaving room 
for vulnerabilities that players may not notice before execution. In this way, the interaction 
between the players would bring forward three major learning points: How the strategies 
work independently, how they work when executed against an opposing strategy, and how 
phasing and timing of the strategies impacts outcomes. This chapter is intended to identify 
and define the key aspects of each strategy, then describe the modifiers and bonuses that 
change gameplay. These advanced modifications are what change the dynamics of the basic 
version of Rebels and States that introduce the player to the different strategies.  
In addition to applying bonuses or modifiers to the different strategies, we also 
applied additional winning conditions that coincide with either the doctrine or strategy. 
Furthermore, we created qualifiers, constraints, or limitations to the amount of times that a 
phase, tenet, aspect, etc., could be played. We acknowledge that this is not realistic but was 
necessary in order to make the game playable. These were created to force players to play all 
aspects and further the learning experience. All strategies can be found in Appendix B. 
A. INSURGENCY AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
An introduction to different insurgency and UW strategies is the diving factor for our 
development of Rebels and States. Given this purpose and our intended audience, the primary 
strategies taught in the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) the additional sources 
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are: Mao Tse Tung, T.E. Lawrence, and the Cuban Revolution. These four sources serve as 
the primary subjects reinforced through gameplay.  
1. U.S. UW Doctrine 
The doctrine utilized by USSF for UW describes a seven-phase strategy that is 
generally followed in a sequential manner. These phases are: Preparation, Initial Contact, 
Infiltration, Organization, Buildup, Employment, and Transition.50 Although these are 
followed in a sequential manner, the transition between phases can actually move backwards 
if required, and can even skip phases when moving forwards. In Rebels and States, the player 
that chooses this strategy starts in Phase 1: preparation and decides to move forward as much 
as they deem necessary in subsequent turns, but can only ever move backwards in phases 
one at a time. Given that UW doctrine is a broad approach, we focused the additional winning 
condition on controlling the majority of the population; the player who uses this strategy 
must control six of the 10 urban and suburban spaces. 
The remainder of this section lists the phases of UW, provides a short description, 
and states the bonus it achieves within the game. 
a. Phase 1: Preparation  
Preparation includes activities USSF personnel would take when anticipating and 
putting together plans, personnel, and equipment to conduct UW operations. These would 
include, but are not limited to, intelligence gathering, synthetization, and planning.51 During 
this phase the player gets an additional DIMEFIL card and can only be used during the first 
two turns.  
b. Phase 2: Initial Contact  
Initial contact is when U.S. government personnel, which can include U.S. military 
or interagency personnel, and potentially members of other nations, conduct an assessment 
to determine the viability of a UW campaign, making contact with various resistances or 
 
50 Department of the Army, Special Forces Operations, 3–5-3–7. 
51 USASOC, Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide, 11. 
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insurgencies.52 During this phase the player can establish one additional guerrilla fighter and 
one additional auxiliary. Once four player spaces are supported or fully supported, the player 
must move to a different phase.  
c. Phase 3: Infiltration 
Infiltration occurs when USSF teams are deployed to an area, normally through low 
visibility means. It is critical that USSF teams are not compromised during this phase or the 
entire operation can result in failure.53 During this phase, the player can infiltrate two 
guerrilla fighters or one auxiliary in to any unoccupied or friendly rural spaces that border 
the insurgent friendly or neutral country, or international waters. The player must change 
phases once they obtain two supported spaces. 
d. Phase 4: Organization  
Organization is when USSF teams determine the structure of the components within 
the resistance or insurgency and re-arrange to maximize effectiveness as required. It is 
literally the organization of the resistance or insurgency to take advantage of the 
environment.54 During this phase, the player can relocate either two guerrilla fighters or 
auxiliary to any friendly occupied space. Once the player gains three or more supported 
spaces, they must change phases. 
e. Phase 5: Build Up  
Build up is growing the resistance or insurgency to meet their means and establishing 
the conditions to achieve their endstate.55 During this phase the player generates one 
additional recruitment point for every two occupied spaces. If the player has occupied an odd 
number of spaces they must round down. Once the player generates 20 or more recruitment 
points, they must change phases.  
 
52 USASOC, 12. 
53 USASOC, 13. 
54 USASOC, 13. 
55 USASOC, 14. 
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f. Phase 6: Employment  
Employment is when the resistance or insurgency begins to overtly operate, 
conducting combat operations against the occupying government or power.56 During this 
phase the player may re-roll one dice per engagement with security forces. Once the player 
gains control of one urban space they must change phases. 
g. Phase 7: Transition  
Transition is when the resistance or insurgency becomes the established government. 
This phase is normally the most difficult to achieve, and has been proven incredibly complex 
in all facets of military operations.57 During this phase the player receives one additional 
legitimacy point for every three controlled spaces. 
2. Mao Tse Tung 
Mao Tse Tung designed and led the communist revolt in China resulting in the 
creation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. What made Mao so essential to the study 
of UW strategy is that he organized the revolution as a “people’s war” where a poor majority 
of farmers could organize against a relatively stronger industrial power. Key to the strategy 
is a three-phased system based on the ability to organize and generate revolutionary combat 
power. The three phases of Mao’s approach are: Strategic Defense, Progressive Expansion, 
and Revolutionary Strategic Offensive.58 The essential design in Mao’s three phased 
strategy is the ability to merge and move seamlessly back and forth between each phase. 
Should a particular region fail in their ability to execute Phase 2 or 3, for example, the design 
allows for the return to a previous phase in order reset conditions. This flexibility to move 
back and forth between phases allows the strategy to be adopted at different times and 
locations throughout the entire campaign. This was an overarching aspect of the strategy 
which we applied to the game in the sense that the player can choose any aspect before the 
 
56 USASOC, 15. 
57 USASOC, 15. 
58 Robert Taber, War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare, Reprint edition 
(Washington, D.C: Potomac Books, 2002), 47–50; Mao Tse-Tung and Samuel Griffith, On Guerrilla 
Warfare (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 2005), 21. 
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start of their turn. The additional winning condition that we developed is that the player must 
control one territory of each population size. The remainder of this section describes the three 
different phases and the bonuses or modifiers we applied. 
a. Phase 1: Strategic Defense 
Phase I is the strategic defense and receives the most emphasis of the three phases.59 
Phase 1 is also referred to as the organization, consolidation, and preservation phase where 
the goal is to recruit a base of supporters and gain material to be used in subsequent phases 
to launch attacks.60 Essential to the first phase is to convince a significant portion of the 
population to “commit themselves to the movement so that it gradually acquires the quality 
of mass.”61 Essential to this phase is encouraging the enemy to spread their forces thin as 
they attempt to control the rising dissent.  
For this phase, the player receives one additional recruitment point for each supported 
space. Once the total number of recruitment points is greater than 15, the player must move 
to a different phase. 
b. Phase 2: Progressive Expansion 
Progressive expansion is when the insurgent increases attacks and escalates the 
conflict, expanding the number of limited raids on relatively weaker government targets in 
order to create a stalemate in the government. The raids allow the insurgent to procure arms, 
ammunition, and essential equipment.62 Ideally, as the guerrillas increase their capabilities 
and attacks, “the government finds that it cannot destroy the guerrillas; for the moment can 
only seek to contain them” and is therefore forced into a stalemate.63 This phase continues 
the cycle of stalemate between government and insurgent forces until the insurgents have 
grown in strength and organization to directly oppose the government. 
 
59 Taber, War of the Flea, 47. 
60 Tse-Tung and Griffith, On Guerrilla Warfare, 20. 
61 Tse-Tung and Griffith, 20. 
62 Tse-Tung and Griffith, 21. 
63 Taber, War of the Flea, 51. 
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During this phase guerrilla forces gain a slight advantage during engagements. the 
guerrilla forces win ties during engagements with security forces when the security forces 
have three or less fighters, regardless of who is attacking or defending. Once the player 
controls an urban space they must move to a different phase. 
c. Phase 3: Revolutionary Strategic Offensive 
The Revolutionary Strategic Offensive is when the insurgent is finally prepared to 
overwhelm the government forces in direct confrontation. It is in this phase that the insurgent 
will slowly combine guerrilla tactics with decisive strategic attacks that will begin to isolate 
parts of the government forces so that they can be destroyed in a systematic fashion.64 Once 
the enemy forces have been overwhelmed, then the insurgent political organizations can 
begin the process of war termination and set conditions for installing the new government.  
During this phase guerillas win ties during engagements if the security forces have 
four or more units on a space. 
3. T. E. Lawrence 
Thomas Edward Lawrence was a British army officer who successfully led the Arab 
revolt against the Ottoman empire during World War I. In his memoirs, titled Seven Pillars 
of Wisdom, Lawrence describes his experience molding the Arab revolt. Lawrence focuses 
on insurgent warfare in a journal article “The Evolution of a Revolt” where he explains his 
analysis and strategy of the Arab revolt campaign. In his assessment, Lawrence found three 
“elements” in his strategy: algebraical, biological and psychological, which are described in 
the following subsections.65 These three elements captured the tangible and intangible 
aspects of a battlefield or scenario. The combination of these three analytical tools allowed 
Lawrence to accurately assess the correct methodology to be employed during the Arab 
revolt and represents his logic of command throughout the campaign. 
 
64 Taber, 51. 
65 T. E. Lawrence, The Evolution of a Revolt (Scotts Valley, CA: CreateSpace Independent Publishing 
Platform, 2014), 7. 
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G.K.B. Barron provides an analysis of Lawrence’s contribution to revolutionary 
warfare in seven individual treatises on essential aspects of revolutionary warfare: the 
motivational cause, the leader, time, support of the population, the struggle, outside support, 
and unassailable bases.66 
To ensure that the players experience all aspects of T.E. Lawrence’s strategy, we first 
combined the seven treatises into three options for the player: motivational cause and the 
leader; time and struggle; and support of the population, outside support, and unassailable 
bases. Combing the three elements with the three (consolidated) treatises gave us six options 
for the player to choose from at the beginning of each turn. The additional winning condition 
for T.E. Lawrence is the player must control all non-water spaces along insurgent friendly 
borders to reinforce his emphasis on outside or external support. The remainder of this 
section provides the description and bonuses or modifiers for the elements and treatises. 
a. Algebraic 
The algebraic element involves calculating known variables including terrain, 
conditions, space, and even time to essentially quantify and prepare the battlespace. The cost 
of one auxiliary is reduced to one point when using this element. 
b. Biological 
The biological element refers to humanity itself and is referred to by Lawrence as 
“Bionomics,” where humans and materials are an essential part of war that are both irrational 
and incalculable and that “can only be ensured by instinct, sharpened by though practicing 
the stroke so often that at the crisis it is as natural as a reflex.”67 This element provides the 
player one additional recruitment point for every space that is fully supported along friendly 
or neutral country borders. 
 
66 G.K.B. Barron, “The Contribution Made by T.E. Lawrence to the Theory of Revolutionary 
Warfare,” South African Journal of Military Studies 13, no. 4 (1983): 50–51. 




The psychological element is where it is essential to organize the thoughts and 
emotions of both friendly and enemy forces. Lawrence puts this as having to “arrange their 
minds in order of battle, just as carefully and as formally as other officers arranged their 
bodies: and not only our own men’s minds, through them first: the minds of the enemy, so 
far as we could reach them: and thirdly, the mind of the nation supporting us behind the firing 
line, and the mind of the hostile nation waiting the verdict, and the neutrals looking on.”68 
This element provides one legitimacy point for every fully supported space during the turn it 
is used. 
d. Motivational Cause and the Leader 
The motivation cause and the leader provide purpose and direction for the insurgent 
campaign. Furthermore, providing such focus for the cause brings about additional support 
and legitimacy to the effort. This treatise provides one legitimacy point for each controlled 
urban space during the turn it is used. 
e. Time and Struggle 
Time and Struggle introduces the concepts of protracted war where the insurgent 
must have discipline, value range over force, and focus on the long-term strategic victory.69 
Essentially, the long game is understood and the hard road to get there is accepted. This 
treatise allows the player to disregard the consolidation requirements and move forces as if 
they were in the Movement Phase. Also, the player only loses 25% of their recruitment points 
if they have to conduct a withdraw. 
f. Support of the Population, Outside Support, and Unassailable Bases 
Support of the population, outside support, and unassailable bases highlight the 
method by which the insurgent campaign is resourced through materials and ideas. As 
opposed to conventional modes of fighting with clear lines of supply, the insurgent must rely 
 
68 Lawrence, 11. 
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on non-standard logistics, reinforcements, and adaptable technology to achieve success over 
government forces. For Lawrence the goal and especially the political support were to an 
extent the lifeblood of his movement.70 This treatise provides the player one recruitment 
point for every occupied space adjacent to the insurgent friendly or neutral border country. 
4. Cuban Revolution 
The Cuban Revolution provides an exceptional example of a revolution where the 
precise application of violence leads to the successful overthrow of a government. Critical to 
the Cuban strategy are two fundamental principles illuminated by Robert Taber’s War of the 
Flea:  
The rebel strategy will be (1) to attack only when assured of success by the 
overwhelming superiority of firepower, position, and the element of surprise, 
and only in pursuit of limited objectives, such as the capture of arms, or to 
create a diversion from some other action, or to avoid encirclement; (2) to use 
the campaign as an educational tool and a propaganda weapon by disclosing 
the impotence of the enemy, showing that he can be defied with impunity; to 
proselytize among the rural population by identifying with its grievances and 
aspirations and by putting the burden and the blame of bloodshed on the 
repressive government as the clear aggressor it will necessarily become in the 
course of the anti-guerrilla campaign.71  
This combination of precisely timed violence with an active information campaign 
allowed Fidel Castro and Che Guevara to successfully overthrow the Cuban government 
during the 1950s.  
While the two principles of the application of violence and information operations 
are only two of many reasons why the Cuban Revolution was successful, they represent 
fundamental elements of the Cuban strategy. In designing his strategy, Castro hoped to be 
able to topple the Cuban regime through a general strike coupled with a military offensive.72 
The Cuban strategy relied on this duality to make military victories appear to be much larger 
successes than what they were in reality. Despite being exceptionally outnumbered, Castro’s 
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ability of combining his limited military capabilities with an aggressive public relations 
campaign is an essential lesson that will be highlighted in the wargame.  
Keeping in line with these two principles, we have given this strategy only two 
options to choose from: Overwhelming Superiority and Educational Propaganda. 
Overwhelming Superiority allows the player to win ties during offensive operations when 
the outnumber their opponent and receive plus one (+1) to their dice role if they outnumber 
their opponent 2:1. Educational Propaganda generate one additional recruitment point for 
each space supported by insurgent forces, with a cap of 25 points. To understand how each 
work, the player much switch between the two principles each turn. Also, the additional 
winning condition is to control at least two urban and the suburban spaces.  
B. COUNTERINSURGENCY 
Just like UW and insurgency, the same COIN subjects that are taught in the SFQC 
are the strategies we selected for this game. First, we use U.S. COIN doctrine as a basis, then 
scoped and synthesized David Galula, Robert Thompson, and the OEF-P Basilan Model. 
Because the framework and LOEs from U.S. COIN doctrine were used to produce the 
general flow of events and structure for the COIN player, the baseline strategy reinforces the 
tenets of the doctrine. David Galula follows a step-by step methodology, Robert Thompson 
uses principles to achieves success, and the OEF-P Basilan Model utilizes a three-step 
process and two principles. Just like the UW and insurgency strategies, the COIN strategies 
were given additional winning conditions and constraints and limitations to force players to 
use the entire strategy. 
1. U.S. COIN Doctrine 
The framework and LOEs for U.S. COIN doctrine have already been described in 
Chapter II and were incorporated into the baseline version of Rebels and States, but U.S. 
COIN doctrine still has valuable information to offer its student and practitioner. COIN 
environments can be ambiguous and complex. Just as UW doctrine is an approach to 
insurgencies and revolution, COIN doctrine provides principles to understand and adhere to 
during its conduct. Joint doctrine provides tenets of COIN that will serve as “guideposts,” 
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while U.S. Army doctrine provides foundations.73 For this strategy, we have scoped these 
tenets and applied bonuses or modifiers for each, which are described in the following 
subsections. The player that chooses this strategy must use a different tenet each turn. Their 
additional winning condition is that they must control that majority of the urban and suburban 
spaces, simulating control and support of the population centers. 
a. Understanding the Operational Environment  
The first tenet of COIN is “Understanding the Operational Environment (OE).”74 
This tenet describes the importance of a detailed understanding of the situation, culture, 
dynamics, and participants to ensure there is full preparation for COIN operations. Within 
the first tenet, there are other aspects of consideration: sociocultural knowledge, or an 
understanding of how and why the society interacts; understanding host nation partners, their 
capabilities, and how they interact with the population; preparation for a long term 
commitment; and learning and adapting, which is critical to an ongoing understanding of the 
OE.75 Ultimately this is all an intellectual preparation to ensure that an effective COIN 
strategy can be employed. This tenet reduces the cost of DIMEFIL Cards by one. 
b. Developing the COIN Narrative 
The next tenet is “Developing the COIN Narrative” which aims to directly counter 
the insurgent narrative.76 Given that the interaction between the insurgent and 
counterinsurgent is a struggle for legitimacy and support of the population, each side will 
inherently have to create a narrative, or storyline, to further their objectives. This means that 
careful thought is critical to the credibility of the counterinsurgent, attack the shortcomings 
and mistakes of the resistance or insurgency, and capitalize on successes of the legitimate 
government. This tenet provides a legitimacy point for every engagement where guerrilla 
 
73 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterinsurgency, III–7. 
74 Joint Chiefs of Staff, III–7. 
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fighters are completely removed from a space or when a space comes under control of the 
counterinsurgent. It is only applicable to one urban and/or two suburban locations. 
c. Primacy of Politics 
The third tenet describes the “Primacy of Politics” to ensure that a political solution 
is found to end the insurgency.77 The goal of a resistance or insurgency are political in nature. 
While military action will take primacy in the beginning of the struggle, it cannot remain the 
main focus, as it is the diplomatic or political solution that will result in the end of hostilities. 
This tenet provides two recruitment points for every local government that has been 
established. 
d. Population Security 
The fourth tenet is “Population Security.”78 During the struggle over power and 
legitimacy, the government and resistance or insurgency find themselves at opposite ends of 
the spectrum, with the population in the middle. It is the population who will ultimately 
determine who wins the struggle, through support to one side or the other. The security of 
the population goes beyond the use of physical security forces, and includes the 
reinforcement of a just rule of law, a fair legal system, and rules of engagement (ROE) of 
security and military forces that prevents further harm to the population.79 Furthermore, 
security of the population means isolating the resistance or insurgency. As described before, 
the components of a resistance or insurgency are the auxiliary, underground, and guerrilla 
force, each of which draws from and is supported by the population. The more effectively 
the counterinsurgent can provide security to the populous, the more effectively it can isolate 
the insurgent. This tenet provides and additional recruitment point for every occupied space 
where security forces are equal to or greater than the number of the population. 
 
77 Joint Chiefs of Staff, III–10. 
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e. Unity of Command and Unity of Effort 
The final tenet of COIN is “Unity of Command and Unity of Effort,” which describes 
the importance of all forces being under one central command structure to enable that all 
actions and efforts are working towards that same goals.80 Additionally, this tenet focuses of 
the importance of working within the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-
national (JIIM) environment to utilize authorities, expertise, and funding to the fullest extent. 
This tenet lets security forces win ties during engagements when they are located within the 
same space as local governments. 
2. David Galula 
David Galula was a French Army officer and COIN theorist who studied the Chinese, 
Greek, Vietnamese, and Huk insurgencies, and then applied his theories in Algeria in 1956 
and later published Counterinsurgency Warfare.81 Galula’s contribution to COIN theory and 
strategy is the concept that the counterinsurgent should focus efforts on the population as 
opposed to the insurgent. In response to Mao Tse Tung’s concept of the “people’s war,” 
Galula devised a step-by-step strategy to ensure that the population could systematically be 
separated from the insurgents. His eight-step strategy of COIN is as follows: 
1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of 
armed insurgents. 
2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent’s comeback in 
strength, install these troops in hamlets, villages, and towns where the 
population lives. 
3. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to 
cut off its links with the guerrillas. 
4. Destroy the local insurgent political organization. 
5. Set up, by means of elections, new provincial local authorities.  
6. Test these authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace 
the softs and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. 
Organize self-defense units.  
7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement.  
 
80 Joint Chiefs of Staff, III–15. 
81 Tucker, Encyclopedia of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, 189. 
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8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants.82 
Galula’s strategy in this case is focused on a specific area, where if these steps are 
executed correctly and in sequence, then order will be restored and this method can then be 
executed in another area. Galula does explicitly state that “the general order in which they 
must be conducted cannot be tampered with under normal conditions without violating the 
principles of counterinsurgency warfare and of plain common sense.”83 In keeping with 
Galula’s mentality, we have designed this strategy to start at Step 1 then move through each 
step without reverting backwards. The additional winning condition that we developed is that 
the player must control one of each population size. The following list describes the bonus 
or modifier and constraint or limitations we’ve applied to each step. 
1. Concentration—generates one additional recruitment point for every 
occupied space with four or more security forces. One the recruitment 
points exceed 15 the player must move forward. 
2. Security Forces in Villages—the player receives three additional security 
forces from supported spaces that equal two or less. Once 12 security forces 
are gain from this step, the player must move forward. 
3. Contact Population—the player can establish one additional essential 
service in rural spaces during the deployment phase. Once three or more 
supported spaces are obtained the player must move forward. 
4. Destroy the local insurgent political organization—The player gains one 
DIMEFIL Card during the recruitment phase. Once three DIMEFIL Cards 
have been obtained the player must move forward. 
 
82 David Galula and John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: 
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5. New Leaders—The player can establish one additional Local Government 
in rural spaces without it needing to be fully supported. Once three Local 
Governments have been established the player must move forward. 
6. Test the authorities—the player receives a legitimacy point for every fully 
supported space established. Once three legitimacy points are obtained the 
player must move forward. 
7. Education—the player can establish one Local Government in any rural or 
suburban space without the fully supported requirement. Once two Local 
Governments are established the player must move forward. 
8. Win—The player can re-roll one attack dice per engagement. 
3. Robert Thompson 
Sir Robert Thompson was a British Army officer and counterinsurgency expert who 
studied the Malayan and Vietnamese insurgencies in the 1950s and 1960s.84 He produced 
several seminal works, including his most influential, Defeating Communist Insurgencies, 
which had an immense influence on the development of modern COIN doctrine. Both the 
Malayan and Vietnamese insurgencies revealed fallacies in strategies where historically 
powerful state actors would often use direct force to deal with an indirect threat. Thompson’s 
COIN theory lies in the adjustment of the government to align all aspects of power through 
matching policies. Instead of defaulting to military power, all instruments of national power, 
or DIMEFIL, are implemented to achieve long term COIN success. Thompson created five 
principles of COIN in order to focus government efforts and policies:  
1. The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain 
a free, independent and united country which is politically and 
economically stable and viable.  
2. The government must function in accordance with law. 
3. The government must have an overall plan.  
4. The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, 
not the guerrillas.  
 
84 Tucker, Encyclopedia of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, 566. 
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5. In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base 
areas first.85 
Due to the asymmetrical nature of combat between insurgent and counterinsurgent 
forces, Thompson’s five principles strive to correctly align the government against the 
strengths and weaknesses of the insurgent. While these five principles appear to be 
rudimentary in concept, they represent a fundamental shift in COIN theory where the entire 
government, and not the military, is required to engage in a long-term campaign to achieve 
success against the insurgent. Understanding the fundamental implications of this national 
level strategy and identifying the appropriate balance between these five principals is an 
essential learning point for players during the wargame. This is why the player must apply 
one principle per turn, then change in subsequent turns. The additional winning condition for 
this strategy is that player must control two urban spaces and three suburban spaces. The 
following list describes the bonuses or modifiers we applied to each principle. 
1. Clear Political Aim—the player gains one legitimacy point for every three 
local governments established. 
2. Law—The player can re-roll one die per engagement that involve security 
forces that are located with a local government. 
3. Overall plan—The player can establish one additional essential service for 
occupying spaces with a population of four or more. 
4. Priority to defeat Political Subversion—the layer gains one legitimacy point 
per turn for every DIMEFIL card played. 
5. Secure Government Base—the play can re-roll the lowest defense dice 
when security forces occupy a supported space. 
 
85 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
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4. Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) Basilan Model 
In 2002, OEF-P planners used Gordon McCormick’s COIN diamond model as a 
basis for their campaign against insurgent organizations, including Abu-Sayyaf. The success 
of the operation prompted the Filipino government to refer to the strategy as the “Basilan 
Model.”86 The model provides a method by which the counterinsurgent can 
comprehensively address the relationships between government, population, insurgent, and 
international actors. The phased methodology of the model uses “Legs” to represent the 
conditions that must be established in order for the government to produce an effective 
strategy against the insurgent. 
 
Figure 18. COIN Diamond Model.87 
First, the government must build legitimacy and control with the people (Leg 1) 
and then use that legitimacy so that the people will identify the insurgent infrastructure 
 
86 Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-PHILIPPINES and The Indirect 
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(Leg 2).88 Once the government has created the first two conditions of Leg 1 and Leg 2 
with the people, then the government can use direct action (Leg 3) to weaken the insurgent 
through force.89 While the government is executing the first three legs of the model, it 
must also address international actors by using diplomacy to build relevance with external 
actors (Leg 4) while reducing the external support that the insurgents will receive including 
sanctuary and resources (Leg 5).90 The diamond model provides the counterinsurgent with 
a framework upon which a comprehensive counter insurgent campaign can be developed. 
Addressing the global reach and ability of the modern-day insurgent to access significant 
external support will be a critical lesson taught in Rebels and States.  
For this strategy, the player must start using Leg 1, then move to Leg 2 and 3 
without ever moving backwards. Simultaneously, they will use either Leg 4 or Leg 5. The 
additional winning condition is that the play must control all spaces along the 
counterinsurgent friendly border, except for space containing water.  
Leg 1: Legitimacy and control provides the player gains one additional legitimacy 
point for every four Security Forces or two Essential Services established. Once three 
legitimacy points have been gained the player must move to Leg 2. Leg 2: Identify 
Insurgents allows the player to remove an additional Auxiliary for every one DIMEFIL 
Card used. Leg 3: Direct Action let the player re-roll one attack dice per engagement. Also, 
if the insurgent is within three points of winning the game, the COIN player can revert back 
to Leg 2 for one turn. 
Simultaneously, Leg 4: External Diplomacy provides one additional recruitment 
point for every supported space along the border with the COIN friendly or neutral 
countries or international waters. Leg 5: Reduce External Support to Insurgents reduces the 
insurgent’s recruitment points by one for every COIN occupied space that borders a 
country or international water. 
 
88 Eric Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” Special Warfare; Fort Bragg 18, no. 2 
(September 2005): 5–6. 
89 Wendt, 5–6. 




Our advanced version of Rebels and States meets our goal of creating this wargame. 
While the bonuses or modifiers may not perfectly simulate the major aspects of these 
strategies, simply reading about each strategy multiple times as it is played out throughout 
a game continuously exposes players to the aspects of the selected strategies. This exposure 
demonstrates the ideal strengths of each strategy, such as Galula’s momentum building 
approach or T.E. Lawrence’s study and analysis of his environment, and how each action 
sets a foundation for the next. At the same time, the interaction between the players also 
exposes potential weaknesses, such as a reliance on massing forces within the Cuban 
Revolution strategy or how a reliance on external support in the OEF-P Basilan model 
requires attention to creating safe-havens along friendly borders, which advances the 
learning experience. Furthermore, Rebels and States is by no means an attempt to produce 
experts in any of these strategies, mainly because each was created for a specific time, 
place, situation, and point in history. Instead, it provides a means for our target audience to 
keep their skill set sharp and understand how to employ these strategies in the future. The 
study helps identify the strengths and weaknesses, so future soldiers know how to combine 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
We designed Rebels and States to be an interactive game that serves as educational 
tool that can augment the traditional study of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. The 
basis in doctrine reinforces the common language spoken within the U.S. Army and aids 
in keeping a military mindset when playing. Through the incorporation of UW and COIN 
doctrine, a foundation of knowledge can be established that breaks away from a traditional 
step-by-step methodology applied when teaching military doctrine. Rebels and States 
requires a deviation from an “if-then,” troubleshooting approach that comes from manuals, 
to a thoughtful methodology using analysis and decision making within parameters or 
“guideposts.” Furthermore, the introduction of the other theorists displays alternative 
methods of conducting UW, insurgency, revolution, or COIN operations in complex and 
ambiguous environments. In this way, Rebels and States met our intent and the introduction 
and application of the chosen strategies. The remainder of this chapter describes future 
options for game development. 
A. DIGITAL VERSION 
A digital version of Rebels and States will have three different advantages that our 
table-top version does not. First, digitizing the game can simplify some of the mechanics, 
such as the addition of recruitment points, or the authorization of certain moves, and 
increase to the speed of the game. Second, digitization of the game can provide additional 
elements of secrecy, which can significantly change the dynamics of the game. For 
example, a digital version can mask the number of fighters in a given space, providing an 
element of surprise when attacking. Also, a digital version can also hide the subversive 
movements of the insurgent player, leaving the COIN player to decide to focus efforts on 
exposing their opponent or to stay the course of their plan. Finally, a digital version can 
allow more people to play Rebels and States. The current game must be played in person 
with all the pieces that we produced, but a digital version requires players to only have a 
computer. Furthermore, we developed this game during the COVID-19 outbreak. This 
hampered our ability to expose more people to the game due to state and local government 
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and Department of Defense restrictions. A digital version would allow players to safely 
play Rebels and States without violating any guidance or restrictions. 
B. ALTERNATIVE VERSIONS 
Any number of alternative versions of Rebels and States can be developed to 
specifically address a certain scenario or strategy. Our selection of the eight strategies was 
based on what is taught at the SFQC and the board that we developed was not based on 
any specific country or scenario. All of this can be customized if players wanted to use 
specific regions or situations address specific problems and can be accomplished be 
adjusting the game board, the environment cards, or the strategies themselves. Of course, 
for it to be effective a thorough analysis of the desired problem set or scenario must be 
conducted first.  
The simplest modification to Rebels and States can be accomplished by conducting 
an analysis of the physical terrain in a country or region. This should include analysis of 
terrain, population centers, and neighboring countries. Players would then array all game 
board pieces to replicate the terrain of their chosen country or region. If needed, additional 
population markers or hexes could be produced to meet the desired intent. 
The next modification that can be made is the adjustment of the environment cards. 
This would begin with an analysis of operational variables, or PMESII-PT, as described in 
Chapter II. Once the analysis is complete, the results can be applied to create a new set of 
fixed environment cards that specifically address the chosen country, scenario, or region. 
Appendix D provides an example of these two modifications. We thoroughly analyzed the 
terrain, societal, and environmental aspects of different CAS countries, then arranged the 
game board to represent the geography and populations of the countries and dictated which 
environment cards to use.  
The final modification that can be made to Rebels and States is to create new 
strategy cards. If a strategy is chosen that already describes tenets, principles, or processes, 
then a simple modification of bonuses or modifiers can be produced. For strategies that do 
not have established processes or principles, a thorough analysis of the goals and tactics 
must first occur. Once these have been identified and categorized, a researcher can develop 
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what is required to sufficiently describe the strategy and, again, bonuses or modifiers can 
be applied. Appendix E provides an example for this modification. We reverse engineered 
and proposed Chinese COIN tenets by conducting an analysis of its tactics and categorizing 
them across DIMEFIL. Once the categorization was complete, we then drew major themes 
or foundational aspects to develop the tenets, and finally applied bonuses and starting/
winning conditions. Both of these appendixes simulate real world scenarios and provide 
examples on how other users can develop something similar. 
C. FURTHER STUDIES IN EFFECTIVENESS 
Rebels and States can serve as a means to study the effectiveness of alternative 
learning methods to students of the SFQC, or any qualification course that involves a study 
of insurgent and counterinsurgent warfare. The most ideal scenario that we identified was 
incorporating this wargame into a portion of the SFQC, and more specifically the 18A SF 
Officer’s Course. At the course, students are broken down into multiple teams. These teams 
could serve as control and test groups. One team could play the basic version of the game, 
one the advanced, and the last not play at all. Their performances in the course and then in 
the culminating exercise of the SFQC could be analyzed to determine the effectiveness of 
Rebels and States’ educational experience. This same methodology could be used where 
the wargaming is used as one of the test groups with other alternative learning methods.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Rebels and States went far beyond what we originally designed it to do. Throughout 
the design phase we noticed additional learning points manifesting themselves. First, we 
constantly witnessed a willingness to take risks to exploit opposing player mistakes and to 
force reactions from the other side. The wargame served as a low risk means to attempt 
new ideas or test out an understanding of an environment. Furthermore, we learned that the 
complexity built within Rebels and States became more akin to a game of chess as we 
witnessed players sacrificing their pieces to force a reaction by their opponent, which in 
turn provided new opportunities to exploit. Second, we observed players beginning to make 
moves that would impact their situation multiple turns down the road, forgoing the urge to 
only look for immediate impacts. As more iterations were played and observed, we 
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identified moves from different players that would only make sense multiple turns later. 
This proved devastating for the players who only focused on the immediate problem. Third, 
as players became more familiar with the game, we saw an increase in the use of the tools 
at their disposal, and a sequencing of these tools to compliment or shape their efforts. It 
became a wholistic approach that incorporated the use of all aspects of the game. Finally, 
as each iteration played out, we noticed that the analysis from turn to turn increased, and 
players found themselves so deep in thought that decisions took longer, not due to a fear 
of being wrong but because every move had greater and more lasting impacts on the game. 
It truly became a learning experience that went beyond the lessons we sought to teach, but 
also about patience, sequencing, shaping an environment, and reading and understanding 
an opponent. These secondary learning experiences took this wargame to another level. 
These four additional points took Rebels and States to a level that we had only 
hoped to achieve. As mentioned in Chapter I, our interests in creating this wargame went 
beyond academic requirements. First, we wanted to create a learning tool that would 
improve the next generation of SOF soldiers beyond what is expected of them. We wanted 
to aid in the development of thinkers and practitioners to ensure that, when called upon, 
they would succeed at any problem thrown their way. Second, we wanted to ensure that 
new support staff to SOF organizations understood that their organization and its members 
are called upon to accomplish some of the most complex and dangerous missions. This 
heavy burden requires not just a different way of conducting business, but also a significant 
investment in the intellectual capacity of its members. Rebels and States provides a way to 
decrease the learning curve when entering a new SOF environment. Finally, we wanted to 
produce a game that kept SOF soldiers’ skills and minds sharp. Just like working a puzzle 
or solving a Rubik’s Cube, engaging in a problem or struggle keeps the mind sharp and 
prepared for contingencies. In this sense, by producing a two-sided game with a UW and 
COIN theme we sought to provide a different way to keep SOF soldiers engaged in the 
insurgency problem set they are likely to encounter in the future. 
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APPENDIX A. RELATIONSHIP OF LEARNING OBJECTIVES TO 
DESIGN AND ACTIONS IN REBELS AND STATES 
Reinforcing doctrine and introduction to insurgent and counterinsurgent strategies 
was central to our game design. We had to balance playability with the educational 
experience to keep students and players interested. For Rebels and States to be an effective 
learning tool, we also had to ensure our learning objectives were either met using the game 
design or incorporated into a game mechanic. The learning objectives served as a guide to 
the game design, parameters for creativity, and ensured we reached our original design 
objectives. In Table 1 we identify the learning objectives and how they are manifested in 
Rebels and States. 
Table 1. Learning Objectives and Manifestation in Rebels and States. 
Learning Objective Design or Mechanic 
Comprehend the doctrinal 
strategies of insurgency and 
COIN 
• Implementation of U.S. UW and COIN doctrine in 
the advanced version 
• “Clear-Hold-Build” methodology for COIN player 
• Aspects of each doctrine given modifiers or 
bonuses correlated with their definitions 
• Reference Chapter V and Appendix B 
Comprehend the theoretical 
strategies of insurgency (Mao 
Tse Tung, T.E. Lawrence, and 
Cuban Revolution) and COIN 
(David Galula, Robert 
Thompson, and OEF-P Basilan 
Model) 
• Implementation of strategies in the advanced 
version 
• Aspects of each strategy given modifiers or 
bonuses 
• Starting and winning conditions are applied to 
correlate with the strategy 
• Reference Chapter V and Appendix B 
Comprehend the fundamental 
infrastructure of an insurgency 
• Insurgent player game pieces reflect fundamentals 
of guerrilla, auxiliary, and underground 




Learning Objective Design or Mechanic 
Comprehend how doctrinal and 
theoretical strategies interact 
• Player interaction during and post-game play 
• Declaration of strategy aspect being used at the 
beginning of each turn 
Comprehend how a complex 
operating environment affects 
the application of strategies 
• Game board designed to display a changing 
environment each game 
• Initial assessment of game board then strategy 
decision 
• Declaration of strategy aspect being used at the 
beginning of each turn 
Reinforce doctrinal terms and 
graphics 
• Use of UW and COIN doctrinal terms for game 
pieces 
• Description (restricted, unrestricted, severely 





APPENDIX B. REBELS AND STATES RULES 
Terms/Definitions: 
 
Attack: When at least one Guerrilla Fighter or Security Force engages a hostile force 
by rolling attack dice. 
Control: Established when an Underground/Local Government is established within a 
space.  
DIMEFIL: Instruments of National Power; Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, 
Financial, Intelligence, Law Enforcement.  
Dormant: When an Auxiliary/Essential Service or Underground/Local Government 
remains in a space that is occupied by opposing Guerrilla Fighters/Security Forces that 
are equal to or greater than the population in that space. Dormant forces do not allow you 
to gain recruitment points but do not lose legitimacy points.  
Engagement: Engagement: Sum of all attacks conducted by Guerrilla Fighters or Security 
Forces from any one space. An engagement can consist of any number of attacks as long 
as the attacking force has the necessary forces 
Established: When an Underground/Local Government/Essential Service is placed 
inside a space and can no longer move. An Auxiliary is established when it is activated in 
the consolidation phase in order to receive recruitment points in subsequent turns.  
Forces: Consist of any of Insurgent and Counterinsurgent pieces including Underground, 
Intelligence, Auxiliary, Guerrilla Fighters, Local Government, Essential Services, 
Auxiliary, Security Forces. 
Friendly Space: Any space containing friendly forces. 
Fully Supported Space: Any friendly space that has three Auxiliary/Essential Services 
more than any hostile Auxiliary/Essential Services. 
Hostile Space: Any space that contains forces of the opposing player.  
Legitimacy points: Points generated when an Underground/Local Government are 
established in a space. Once an Underground/Local Government control a space, they 
receive legitimacy points equivalent to the population in that space. The only way to lose 
legitimacy points is when those forces are destroyed.  
Neutral Space: Any space on the board that is not occupied by forces from either the 
Insurgent or Counterinsurgent.  
Occupy: When any Insurgent of Counterinsurgent forces are present in any one space.  
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Population: The single number (1 through 6) present in each space denotes the amount of 
people in any given location. 1 represents the lowest population and 6 represents the highest 
population.  
Recruitment Points: Points acquired during the deployment phase that allow either player 
to acquire additional forces and are generated by totaling the number of population spaces 
that are supported, fully supported, or controlled by either Auxiliary/Essential Services 
Restricted Terrain: Requires forces to pay one movement point in the movement phase 
to move through this space. 
Rural Space: Any space with a population of one or two.  
Severely Restricted Terrain: Requires forces to pay two movement points in the 
movement phase to move through this space. 
Suburban Space: Any space with a population of three or four.  
Support: Achieved when either player has at least one Auxiliary/Essential Services in 
any single space while accompanied by Guerrilla Fighters/Security Forces equal to the 
population in that space or an Underground/Local Government present in the space. If 
opposing Auxiliary/Essential Services are present, the player with most Auxiliary/
Essential Services in that space has achieved support for that space.  
Unrestricted Terrain—Forces pay no movement point in the movement phase to move 
through this space.  
Urban Terrain: Any space with a population of five or six. 
 
INSURGENT FORCES 
- Underground—Allows the player to control space, generates legitimacy points, 
and generate recruitment points equal to the population in that space. 
Underground can only be established in spaces that are fully supported. 
Underground cannot move once established. Cost—4 recruitment points 
- DIMEFIL Card—Allows a player to remove opposing Forces or maneuver 
forces for a dynamic strike. Player may recruit only one intelligence card per turn. 
Player may use one DIMEFIL Card per turn in their engagement phase. Player 
may only maintain 5 DIMEFIL Cards per turn. Cost—3 recruitment points.  
- Auxiliary—Generates additional forces by allowing the player to create 
recruitment points equal to the population in that space. Must be present in a 
space for one full turn before the player can generate additional recruitment 
points. Allows for the player to deploy newly recruited forces into spaces that 
have Auxiliary present. Auxiliary can move into spaces with hostile forces. 
Allows for the player to move forces from one space into another position 
containing Auxiliary in the consolidation phase. Cost—2 recruitment points. 
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- Guerrilla Fighters—Allows a player to engage opposing Security Forces in 
order to secure a neutral or enemy space. Spaces are secure when the number of 
Guerrilla Fighters equals the population size the space which the occupy. Cost—
1 recruitment point. 
COUNTER INSURGENT FORCES 
- Local Government—Control space and generates legitimacy and recruitment 
points equal to the population in that space. Local Government can only be 
established in spaces that are fully supported Local Government cannot move 
once established. Cost—4 recruitment points 
- DIMEFIL Card - Allows a player to remove opposing Forces. Player may 
recruit only one intelligence card per turn. Player may use one DIMEFIL Card 
per turn in their engagement phase. Player may only maintain 5 DIMEFIL Cards 
per turn. Cost—3 recruitment points. 
- Essential Services—Generates additional forces by allowing the player to create 
recruitment points equal to the population in that space. Allows for the player to 
deploy newly recruited forces into spaces that hold Essential Services. Allows for 
the player to move forces from one space into another position containing 
Essential Services in the consolidation phase. Essential Services cannot move 
once established. Essential Services can only be established in a space that has 
been secured by Security Forces for one previous turn. Cost—2 recruitment 
points. Cost—2 recruitment points. 
- Security Forces—Allows a player to engage opposing Guerrilla forces in order 
to secure a neutral or enemy space. Must be occupy a space for one full turn with 
Security Forces equal to the population in order establish Essential Services. 





1. SETUP GAMEBOARD 
 There are a total of 37 spaces that must be arrayed for the board. To create the 
board, randomly select a space and place it in the center of a table, then place additional 
spaces in an outward clockwise spiral until the board is in a 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 6 x 5 x 4 pattern. 
 There are a total of 30 population markers that must be array on the spaces. Begin 
by placing a random population marker in the center space, then place additional 
population markers in an outward counter-clockwise spiral until all space have a marker. 
The only spaces that should not have a marker are water spaces. 
 There are a total of six border pieces. Place the border pieces upside down around 
the border aligning with the apexes of the game board. Once all are in place, flip them over 
to reveal the types and locations of the borders. 
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2. SELECT ENVIRONMENT CARDS 
 There is a total of five (5) environment card categories: Politics, Society, 
Economics, Media, and Security Forces. There are three different cards per category. One 
player will randomly select one card from each category. These categories set the initial 
conditions for the game and have certain bonuses applied to the beginning of the game 
only. 
3. SELECT OVERALL STRATEGY  
1. Insurgent selects either Mao Tse Tung, T.E. Lawrence, Cuban, or U.S. 
Unconventional Warfare doctrine as their strategist. 
2. Counterinsurgent selects either U.S. Counterinsurgency doctrine, David Galula, 
Robert Thompson, or U.S. Basilan model as their strategist.  
4. ARRAY FORCES 
 Both players begin with 10 recruitment points plus any bonuses from the 
environment cards. Both players select forces from the allotment of recruitment points. The 
insurgent will place their forces on the board first, followed by the counterinsurgent.  
 Amongst the varying population and terrain locations that players can choose from, 
there are two distinct rules that are applied for the first turn: 
1. The insurgent cannot occupy any space with a population of 3 or more. 
2. The counterinsurgent must secure at least one (1) population space of 5 or 
6. 
5. INSURGENT GETS FIRST TURN 
 
TURN ORDER OF OPERATIONS 
 The players will alternate turns. The insurgent will play all six phases, followed by 
the counterinsurgent, alternating until one player has achieved 15 legitimacy points and 
their strategy win conditions.  
1. Determine aspects of strategy for employment this turn 
2. Recruitment Phase 
3. Deployment Phase 
4. Movement Phase 
5. Engagement phase 
6. Consolidation phase 
1. INSURGENT  
Recruitment Phase- Insurgent generates new forces equal to the number of 
population spaces that they support, fully support, or control. The insurgent player must 
activate any Auxiliaries in a space before they can recruit. Auxiliaries are activated in the 
consolidation phase of the subsequent turn. For example, if an Auxiliary moves into a space 
on turn 2, the Auxiliary is activated on the consolidation of turn 3, allowing the player to 
collect recruitment points during the recruitment phase of Phase 4.  
Deployment Phase- Forces may only be placed in locations where Auxiliary are 
established. Underground can only be established in fully supported spaces. Unused 
recruitment points are lost if not played this turn.  
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Movement Phase- Insurgent can move any Guerrilla Forces or Auxiliary 
through adjacent spaces based on the terrain in each space. Auxiliary may move into 
spaces that do not have Guerrilla Fighters. 
Movement is restricted based on the physical terrain in each space. Any force has 
three movement points per player turn. First the player subtracts movements points based 
on the terrain in the space which the force is starting from (0 movement points for 
unrestricted terrain, 1 movement point for restricted terrain, 2 movement points for 
severely restricted terrain). Then the player pays one movement point to move into an 
adjacent space. Repeat the process of 1) assessing the terrain and 2) moving until the force 
is out of movement points.  
COUNTERINSURGENT  
Recruitment- Counterinsurgent generates new forces equal to the number of 
population spaces that they support, fully support, or control. The counterinsurgent must 
have Security Forces equal to or greater than the population in a space for one full turn 
before Essential Services can be established in a space. For example, if three Security 
Forces are moved into a space on turn 2, the Security Forces must remain in place and 
must be equal to or greater than population in that space for the entirety of turn 3 and an 
Essential Service must be established in that space during turn 3 in order to then recruit 
from that space during turn 4.  
Deployment- Forces may only be placed in locations where Essential Services are 
established. Local Government can only be established in fully supported spaces. Unused 
recruitment points are lost if not played this turn.  
Movement- Counterinsurgent can move any Security Forces through adjacent 
spaces based on the terrain in each space. The counterinsurgent must place Security Forces 
equal to the population in a space for at least one turn before Essential Services or Local 
Government can be established, this is considered having secured the population.  
Movement is restricted based on the physical terrain in each space. Any force has 
three movement points per player turn. First the player subtracts movements points based 
on the terrain in the space which the force is starting from (0 movement points for 
unrestricted terrain, 1 movement point for restricted terrain, 2 movement points for 
severely restricted terrain). Then the player pays one movement point to move into an 
adjacent space. Repeat the process of 1) assessing the terrain and 2) moving until the force 
is out of movement points.  
 
ENGAGEMENT PHASE: 
Engagements by forces are restricted in their attack by the physical terrain they 
move through with equivalent restrictions of the movement phase. Any force has three 
engagement points per player turn. First the player subtracts engagement points based on 
the terrain in the space which the force is starting from (0 engagement points for 
unrestricted terrain, 1 engagement point for restricted terrain, 2 engagement points for 
severely restricted terrain). Then the player pays one engagement point to attack into an 
adjacent space and moving any forces into that adjacent space if the defenders are 
eliminated. Repeat the process of 1) assessing the terrain and 2) attacking until the force is 
out of engagement points. 
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Attack- To engage a hostile space the player may roll red attack dice. If the 
insurgent has three or more Guerrilla/Security Forces, they may roll three red attack dice. 
If the insurgent is attacking with two Guerrilla/Security Forces, they may roll two red 
attack dice. If the insurgent is attacking with one Guerrilla/Security Force, they may only 
roll one red attack dice. If the defending insurgent player has two or more Guerrilla Forces 
in the hex they are defending, they may roll two white defend dice. If the defending 
insurgent player has only one Guerrilla Force/Security Force in the space they are 
defending, they may only roll one white defense dice. Both players roll their allotted dice, 
the players will match up to two of their highest dice rolls. For each dice that has a higher 
dice roll, remove one Guerrilla/Security Force. The defender wins any ties.  
Reconnaissance in Force—A player can choose to use Guerrilla/Security Forces 
to engage an adjacent hostile space that doesn’t have opposing Guerrilla/Security Forces 
but contains other hostile forces. The player can move any number of Guerrilla/Security 
Forces into that space; however, they must keep at least one Guerrilla/Security Forces in 
the original space from which the engagement was initiated. If the number of Guerrilla/
Security Forces equal the population in that space, any hostile forces go dormant. This 
costs no engagement points and forces conducting this action can conduct no further 
engagements or actions this phase.  
Withdraw- The defending side can withdraw forces from one space prior to a 
hostile engagement. The withdrawing force can only move its forces into an adjacent 
friendly or neutral space. This comes at a cost of 25% of the recruitment points for the next 
turn. When determining the exact amount of recruitment point lost, conduct the required 
math then always round down. For example, 19 recruitment points x 0.25 = 4.75, rounding 
down equals only 4 recruitment points. Withdraw ends the attacker’s engagement for that 
space but they may still conduct a Reconnaissance in Force.  
INSURGENT ENGAGEMENT PHASE 
Insurgent can engage neutral or enemy spaces adjacent to space that contain 
Guerrilla Forces. To engage a neutral space, move at least one Guerrilla Forces or 
Auxiliary piece into the adjacent space.  
Insurgent can play one and only one DIMEFIL Card at any point in the 
engagement phase.  
There is no limit to the total amount of engagements per turn. 
COUNTERINSURGENT ENGAGEMENT PHASE 
Counterinsurgent can engage neutral or enemy spaces adjacent to space that contain 
Security Forces. To engage a neutral space, move at least one Security Force or Auxiliary 
piece into the adjacent space.  
Counterinsurgent can play one and only one DIMEFIL Card at any point in the 
engagement phase. This counts as one engagement 
There is no limit to the total amount of engagements per turn. 
 
CONSOLIDATION PHASE 
5. INSURGENT CONSOLIDATES 
The Insurgent can move Guerrilla Forces from any one space containing 
Auxiliary to any other single space that also contains an Auxiliary in order to reposition 
those pieces for future attack or defense.  
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6. COUNTER INSURGENT CONSOLIDATES 
The Counterinsurgent can move Security Forces from any one space containing 
Essential Services to any other single space that also contains an Essential Services in 
order to reposition those pieces for future attack or defense.  
Win Condition: The first player to achieve 15 legitimacy points and meets the additional 
winning condition for their strategy wins the game. Player adjusts the Legitimacy Points 
slider immediately upon establishing Underground/Local Government or removing an 
Underground/Local Government with an Intelligence Card. Additionally, a player can 
win by eliminating all opposing fighters (Guerrillas/Security Forces) or support functions 
(Auxiliary/Essential Services) which prevents the opposing player from regenerating 
recruitment points. 
Players must also achieve the specified win condition for their respective strategists in 






Mao Tse Tung—Mao’s contribution to UW strategy is that he organized the 
revolution in a construct of “people’s war” where a poor majority of farmers could organize 
against a relatively stronger industrial power. Key to the strategy is a three phased system 
based on the ability to organize and generate revolutionary combat power. The essential 
design in Mao’s three phased strategy is the ability to merge and move seamlessly back 
and forth between each phase. Should a particular region fail in their ability to execute 
phase II or III, then the design allows for the return to a previous phase in order reset 
conditions. This flexibility to move back and forth between phases allows the strategy to 
be adopted at different times and locations throughout the entire campaign. 
The Mao insurgent must initiate the first turn in Phase 1—Strategic Defensive. The 
insurgent player may switch to any phase prior to any deployment phase provided the 
conditions on the board allow it. 
Additional Winning Condition: Control one of each population size (1 x Urban, 1 
x Suburban, 1 x Rural) 
Phase 1—Strategic Defensive  
Phase I is also referred to as the organization, consolidation and preservation phase 
where the goal is to recruit a base of supporters and gain material from which guerrilla 
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operations in the following phase can use to launch attacks.91 Essential to the first phase is 
to convince a significant portion of the population to “commit themselves to the movement 
so that it gradually acquires the quality of mass.”92 Essential to this phase is encouraging 
the enemy to spread their forces thin as they attempt to control the rising dissent. When 
conditions are right and the peasant masses are organized, the strategy can progress to more 
offensive tactics.  
Insurgent receives one (1) additional recruitment point during the deployment 
phase for each supported space. Once the total number of recruitment points generated 
reaches more than 15 the insurgent must move to a different phase. 
 Phase 2—Progressive Expansion  
Progressive Expansion is where the insurgent increases attacks and escalates the 
conflict. Guerrilla forces increase the number of limited raids. The raids allow the insurgent 
to procure arms, ammunition, and essential equipment.93 Ideally, as the guerrillas increase 
their capabilities and attacks, “the government finds that it cannot destroy the guerrillas; 
for the moment can only seek to contain them” and is therefore forced into a stalemate.94 
This phase continues the cycle of stalemate between government and insurgent forces until 
the insurgents have grown in strength and organization to directly oppose the government. 
Guerrilla Forces win ties during engagements with Security Forces that number 
three or less. Once the Insurgent controls an urban space they must move to a different 
phase. If recruitment points fall below 15, the insurgent may move back to Phase 1: 
Strategic Defensive. 
Phase 3—Revolutionary Strategic Offensive 
The Revolutionary Strategic Offensive is when the insurgent is finally prepared to 
overwhelm the government forces in direct confrontation. It is in this phase that the 
insurgent will slowly combine guerrilla tactics with decisive strategic attacks that will 
 
91 Taber, War of the Flea, 47. 
92 Tse-Tung and Griffith, On Guerrilla Warfare, 20. 
93 Tse-Tung and Griffith, 21. 
94 Taber, War of the Flea, 51. 
 
83 
begin to isolate parts of the government forces so that they can be destroyed in a systematic 
fashion.95 Once the enemy forces have been overwhelmed, then the insurgent political 
organizations can begin the process of war termination and set conditions for installing the 
new government.  
Guerrilla Forces win ties during engagements with Security Forces that number 
four (4) or more. If the insurgent loses control of an urban space they can move back to 
Phase 2: Progressive Expansion. If recruitment points fall below 15, the insurgent may 
move back to Phase 1: Strategic Defensive. 
T.E. Lawrence  
Thomas Edward Lawrence was a British army officer who successfully led the 
Arab revolt against the Ottoman empire during World War I. In his memoirs, titled Seven 
Pillars of Wisdom, Lawrence describes his experience molding the Arab revolt. Lawrence 
focuses on insurgent warfare in a journal article “The Evolution of a Revolt” where he 
explains his analysis and strategy of the Arab revolt campaign. In his assessment, Lawrence 
found three “elements” in his strategy: algebraical, biological and psychological, described 
below.96 
During the first turn, the Insurgent must occupy at least one (1) space located along 
the insurgent friendly border. The insurgent player can choose either one of the three 
elements or one of the two treatises to employ during their turn. The same element or 
treatise cannot be played consecutively. 
Additional Winning Condition: Must control all spaces along Insurgent friendly 
country borders. Disregard this requirement if all spaces along the insurgent friendly 




95 Taber, 51. 




Algebraic element involves calculating known variables including terrain, 
conditions, space, and even time to essentially quantify and prepare the battlespace. 
The Insurgent player cost for Auxiliary is reduced to one recruitment point. 
The biological element refers to humanity itself and is referred to by Lawrence as 
“Bionomics,” where humans and materials are an essential part of war that are both 
irrational and incalculable and that “can only be ensured by instinct, sharpened by though 
practicing the stroke so often that at the crisis it is as natural as a reflex.”97  
The Insurgent player generates one additional recruitment points per deployment 
phase, for every space fully supported along the friendly or neutral country border.  
The psychological element is where it is essential to organize the thoughts and 
emotions of both friendly and enemy forces. Lawrence puts this as having to “arrange their 
minds in order of battle, just as carefully and as formally as other officers arranged their 
bodies: and not only our own men’s minds, through them first: the minds of the enemy, so 
far as we could reach them: and thirdly, the mind of the nation supporting us behind the 
firing line, and the mind of the hostile nation waiting the verdict, and the neutrals looking 
on.”98  
The Insurgent gets one (1) legitimacy point for every fully supported space 
established this turn.  
Treatise: 
Motivation Cause and the Leader provide purpose and direction for the insurgent 
campaign. 
The Underground receives one additional legitimacy point per for each controlled 
urban space during this turn.  
 
97 Lawrence, 9. 
98 Lawrence, 11. 
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Time and Struggle introduces the concepts of protracted war where the insurgent 
must have discipline, value range over force, and focus on the long-term strategic victory.99  
During consolidation phase, the Insurgent player can disregard the consolidation 
requirements and the forces from one space can conduct movement as if it were the 
movement phase. The Insurgent player loses only 10% of their recruitment points during 
their next turn after withdrawing. 
Support of the population, outside support, and unassailable bases highlight the 
method by which the insurgent campaign is resourced through materials and ideas. As 
opposed to conventional modes of fighting with clear lines of supply, the insurgent must 
rely on non-standard logistics, reinforcements, and adaptable technology to achieve 
success over government forces. For Lawrence the goal and especially the political support 
were to an extent the lifeblood of his movement.100  
The Insurgent player receives one recruitment point for every occupied space that 
is adjacent to the Insurgent friendly or neutral border country.  
Cuban Revolution: 
The Cuban Revolution provides an exceptional example of a revolution where the 
precise application of violence and lead to the successful overthrow of a government. 
Critical to the Cuban strategy are two fundamental principles illuminated by Robert 
Taber’s War of the Flea, that include overwhelming superiority and propaganda.101 The 
combination of precisely timed violence with an active information campaign allowed 
Fidel Castro and Che Guevara to successfully overthrow the Cuban government during the 
1950s.  
 The Insurgent player must choose either fundamental principle of overwhelming 
superiority or educational propaganda for the first turn. If the insurgent player must 
alternate between the two fundamental principles on subsequent turns.  
 
99 Barron, “The Contribution Made by T.E. Lawrence to the Theory of Revolutionary Warfare,” 50. 
100 Barron, 51. 
101 Taber, War of the Flea, 27. 
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Additional Winning Condition: Control at least two (2) urban spaces and three (3) 
suburban spaces. 
Overwhelming superiority: “The rebel strategy will be to attack only when 
assured of success by the overwhelming superiority of firepower, position, and the element 
of surprise, and only in pursuit of limited objectives, such as the capture of arms, or to 
create a diversion from some other action, or to avoid encirclement.” 102 
Guerrilla Fighters win ties during offensive engagements when they outnumber 
their opponent. When Guerrilla Fighters outnumber the Security Forces with 2 attackers 
to 1 defender, the Guerrilla Fighters receive plus one to one of their dice when conducting 
an engagement.  
Educational Propaganda: “To use the campaign as an educational tool and a 
propaganda weapon by disclosing the impotence of the enemy, showing that he can be 
defied with impunity; to proselytize among the rural population by identifying with its 
grievances and aspirations and by putting the burden and the blame of bloodshed on the 
repressive government as the clear aggressor it will necessarily become in the course of the 
anti-guerrilla campaign.” 103 
Insurgent Auxiliary generate one additional recruitment point for each space 
supported by insurgent forces. There is a recruitment point cap of 25 for this principle. 
U.S. Unconventional Warfare Doctrine 
There are seven phases of UW that describe a systematic approach starting from 
preparation to transition of the resistance or insurgency to the legitimate authority. The 
seven phases are: Preparation, Initial Contact, Infiltration, Organization, Buildup, 
Employment, and Transition.104 While these phases are laid out in a linear fashion within 
doctrine, a resistance or insurgency can move forwards and backwards between these 
 
102 Taber, 27. 
103 Taber, 27. 
104 Department of the Army, Special Forces Operations, 3–5-3–7. 
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phases, even skipping some altogether at times dependent on the situation and preparedness 
of the organization. 
The Insurgent player must begin the first turn in Phase 1: Preparation phase. The 
U.S. player may choose to move forward to later phases during their deployment phase 
however they may only move back to one previous phase per deployment phase.  
Additional Winning Condition: Must control the majority of the urban and 
suburban spaces (6/10). 
Phase 1: Preparation  
All activities USSF personnel would take when preparing to conduct UW 
operations. These would include, but are not limited to, intelligence gathering, 
synthetization, and planning.105  
The Insurgent player gains one additional DIMEFIL card. Phase 1 is only active 
for the first two turns, then the player must move to Phase 2.  
Phase 2: Initial Contact  
Initial contact is when U.S. Government personnel, which can include U.S. military 
or interagency personnel, and potentially members of other nations, conduct an assessment 
to determine the viability of a UW campaign, making contact with various resistances or 
insurgencies.106 
The Insurgent player can establish one additional Guerrilla Fighter and one 
additional Auxiliary in addition to their standard allotment of recruitment points. Once 
four spaces are supported or fully supported the player must move to Phase 3.  
Phase 3: Infiltration  
 
105 USASOC, Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide, 11. 
106 USASOC, 12. 
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Infiltration occurs when USSF teams are deployed to an area, normally through low 
visibility means. It is critical that USSF teams are not compromised during this phase or 
the entire operation can result in failure.107 
The Insurgent player can infiltrate two Guerrilla Fighters or one Auxiliary in any 
unoccupied or friendly rural spaces that borders the Insurgent Friendly Country, Neutral 
Country, or International Waters. These forces are not in addition to the recruitment 
allotment but allow the player to maneuver newly recruited forces without the requirement 
for established Auxiliary. These forces may not move once infiltrated. Once the player 
obtains two supported spaces using this Phase, they must move to Phase 4.  
Phase 4: Organization  
Organization is when USSF teams determine the structure of the components within 
the resistance or insurgency and re-arrange to maximize effectiveness as required. It 
literally is the organization of the resistance or insurgency to take advantage of the 
environment.108 
The Insurgent player can relocate either two Guerrilla Fighters or Auxiliary to 
any friendly occupied space during the movement phase. Once three or more supported 
spaces are gained from this Phase, the player must move to Phase 5.  
Phase 5: Build Up  
Build Up is the growing of the resistance or insurgency to meet their means and 
establishing the conditions to achieve their endstate.109  
The Insurgent player generates one additional recruitment point for every two 
occupied spaces. Once the player generates 20 or more recruitment points, they must move 
to Phase 6. 
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Phase 6: Employment  
Employment is when the resistance or insurgency begins to overtly operate, 
conducting combat operations against the occupying government or power.110 
The Insurgent player may re-roll one dice per engagement with Security Forces. 
Once the insurgent gains control of one urban space they must move to Phase 7. 
Phase 7: Transition  
Transition is when the resistance or insurgency becomes the established 
government. This phase is normally the most difficult to achieve and has been proven 
incredibly complex in all facets of military operations.111 
The Insurgent receives one additional legitimacy point for every three spaces 
controlled by the counterinsurgent. 
COUNTERINSURGENCY  
David Galula 
David Galula was a French Army officer and COIN theorist who applied his study 
of the Chinese, Greek, Vietnamese, and Huk insurgencies to practice in Algeria in 1956 
and later published Counterinsurgency Warfare.112 Galula’s contribution to COIN theory 
and strategy is the concept that the counterinsurgent should focus efforts on the population 
as opposed to the insurgent. In response to Mao Zedong’s concept of the “people’s war,” 
Galula devised a step-by-step strategy to ensure that the population could systematically 
be separated from the insurgent. 
Galula’s strategy in this case is focused on a specific or local area, where if these 
steps are executed correctly and in sequence, then order will be restored and this method 
can then be executed in another area. Galula does explicitly state that “the general order in 
 
110 USASOC, 15. 
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which they must be conducted cannot be tampered with under normal conditions without 
violating the principles of counterinsurgency warfare and of plain common sense.” 113 
The Counterinsurgent must begin the first turn in Step 1. The Counterinsurgent 
must progress through the steps and cannot revert to previous steps during the game.  
Additional Winning Condition: Control one of each population size (1 x urban, 1 x 
suburban, 1 x rural) 
Step 1. Concentration: “Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel 
the main body of armed insurgents.” 114 
The Counterinsurgent generates one additional recruitment point for every 
occupied population space with four or more security forces. Once the amount of 
recruitment point exceeds 15 the player must move to Step 2. 
Step 2. Security Forces in Villages: “Detach for the area sufficient troops to 
oppose an insurgent’s comeback in strength, install these troops in hamlets, villages, and 
towns where the population lives.” 115 
During recruitment, the Counterinsurgent gains an additional three Security 
Forces from supported spaces where the population equals two or less. Once the player 
gains 12 or more Security Forces from this Step, they must move to Step 3.  
Step 3. Contact Population: “Establish contact with the population, control its 
movements in order to cut off its links with the guerrillas.” 116  
The Counterinsurgent can establish one additional Essential Service in rural 
spaces during their deployment phase. Once the Counterinsurgent player has established 
three (3) or more supported spaces they must move to Step 4. 
 
113 Galula and Nagl, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 56. 
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Step 4. “Destroy the local insurgent political organization.” 117 
The Counterinsurgent gains one DIMEFIL Card during their recruitment phase. 
Once the Counterinsurgent gains a total of three (3) DIMEFIL Cards from this bonus they 
must move to Step 5. 
Step 5. New Leaders: “Set up, by means of elections, new provincial local 
authorities.” 118 
The Counterinsurgent can establish one additional Local Government in rural 
spaces during their deployment phase without the need for having fully supported spaces. 
Once three (3) Local Governments are established the player must move to Step 6. 
Step 6. “Test the authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks.” 119 
“Replace the softs and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. Organize 
self-defense units.” 120 
For every fully supported space established during this Step, the Counterinsurgent 
receives one additional legitimacy point. Once the Counterinsurgent receives, three 
legitimacy points from this Step, the Counterinsurgent must move to Step 7.  
Step 7. “Education Group and educate the leaders in a national political 
movement.” 121 
The Counterinsurgent can establish one Local Government in any rural or 
suburban space without the requirement for a fully supported space. Once the 
Counterinsurgent player gains two (2) Local Governments using this Step, they must move 
to Step 8. 
Step 8. “Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants.” 122 
 
117 Galula and Nagl, 55–56. 
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The Counterinsurgent can reroll one attack dice per engagement.  
Robert Thompson  
Sir Robert Thompson was a British Army officer and counterinsurgency expert who 
studied Malayan and Vietnamese insurgencies in the 1950s and 1960s.123 He produced 
several seminal works, including his most influential Defeating Communist Insurgencies 
which have had an immense influence on the development of modern COIN doctrine. Both 
the Malayan and Vietnamese insurgencies revealed fallacies in strategies where historically 
powerful state actors would often use direct force to deal with an indirect threat. In order 
to adjust to this new dynamic, Thompson’s theory of counterinsurgency lies in the 
adjustment of the government to align all aspects of power through matching policies. 
Instead of defaulting to military power, all instruments of national power (diplomacy, 
information, military, economics, financial, intelligence, law enforcement), or DIMEFIL, 
are implemented to achieve long term COIN success. Thompson created five principles of 
COIN in order to focus government efforts and policies:  
At the beginning of each deployment phase the Counterinsurgent can choose to 
focus on any one of the following principles, which cannot be played in consecutive turns.  
Additional Winning Condition: Control at least two (2) urban spaces and three (3) 
suburban spaces. 
Principle 1. Clear Political Aim: “The government must have a clear political 
aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically 
and economically stable and viable.”124 
The Counterinsurgent gains one additional legitimacy point for every three Local 
Governments established.  
Principle 2. Law: “The government must function in accordance with law.”125 
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The Counterinsurgent can re-roll one attack or defense die per engagement where 
a Local Government is located with the Security Forces.  
Principle 3. Overall Plan: “The government must have an overall plan.”126 
The Counterinsurgent can establish one additional Essential Service for occupying 
spaces with a population of four or more.  
Principle 4. Priority to defeat Political Subversion: “The government must give 
priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas.”127 
The Counterinsurgent gains one legitimacy point per turn for every DIMEFIL 
Card played. 
Principle 5. Secure Government Base: “In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, 
a government must secure its base areas first.”128  
The Counterinsurgent can re-roll the lowest defense dice per engagement where 
Security Forces occupy a supported space.  
Basilan Model  
In 2002, OEF-P planners used Gordon McCormick’s COIN diamond model as a 
basis for their campaign against insurgent organizations, including Abu-Sayyaf. The 
success of the operation prompted the Filipino government to refer to the strategy as the 
“Basilan Model.”129 McCormick’s Diamond model provides a method by which the 
counterinsurgent can comprehensively address the relationships between government, 
population, insurgent, and international actors. The phased methodology of the model uses 
“Legs” to represent the conditions that must be established in order for the government to 
produce an effective strategy against the insurgent. 
At the beginning of each deployment phase the Counterinsurgent must begin with 
Leg 1 and may progress forward sequentially through to Leg 2 and 3. The 
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Counterinsurgent may not return to previous legs. Additionally, the Counterinsurgent must 
select to focus on either Leg 4 or Leg 5 which are played concurrently with either Leg 1, 
2, or 3. Legs 4 or 5 and can only be played for two (2) consecutive turns. 
Additional Winning Condition: Must control all spaces along COIN friendly 
border except for spaces containing water. 
Leg 1: Legitimacy and Control: “The government must build legitimacy and 
control with the people.” 130 
The Counterinsurgent gains one additional legitimacy point for every four Security 
Forces or two Essential Services established at the beginning of the deployment phase. 
Once this has provided three (3) legitimacy points the player must move to Leg 2. 
Leg 2: Identify Insurgents: “Use the legitimacy and control from Leg 1 so that 
the people will identify the insurgent infrastructure.” 131 
The Counterinsurgent may remove any one additional Auxiliary for every one (1) 
DIMEFIL Card used this turn. Once this has been used three (3) times the player must 
move to Leg 3. 
Leg 3: Direct Action: Once the government has created the first two conditions of 
Leg 1 and Leg 2 with the people, then the government can use direct action (Leg 3) to 
weaken the insurgent through force.132 
The Counterinsurgent can re-roll one attack dice per attack. If the Insurgent is 
within three points of winning the game, the Counterinsurgent can revert back to Leg 2 for 
only one (1) turn. 
Leg 4: External Diplomacy: “The government must also address international 
actors by using diplomacy to build relevance with external actors.” 133 
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Receive one additional recruitment point for every supported space along the 
border with an adjacent friendly country, neutral country, or international waters. 
Leg 5: Reduce External Support to Insurgents: “The government must reduce 
the external support that the insurgents will receive including sanctuary and resources.” 134 
Reduce the Insurgent’s recruitment points by one (1) during the following turn for 
every space along the border with any adjacent country or international waters that is 
occupied by the Counterinsurgent.  
U.S. COIN Doctrine 
COIN is “a comprehensive civilian and military effort designed to simultaneously 
defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.”135 This is not a military-only 
approach. A coordinated effort between the military and civil agencies and organizations 
is required to successfully conduct COIN. The U.S. can find itself conducting COIN in one 
of two ways: intervening on the behalf of another government, such as during the 
Salvadorian Civil War, or after major combat operations as the U.S.-backed established 
government faces an insurgency, such as in Iraq.136 Regardless, a joint, interagency, 
intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) effort is critical to success. 
At the beginning of each deployment phase, the Counterinsurgent must select one COIN 
Tenet. The Counterinsurgent must select a different tenet each turn.  
Additional Winning Condition: Must control the majority of the urban and 
suburban spaces (6/10). 
COIN Tenet - Understanding the Operational Environment. This tenant 
describes the importance of a detailed understanding of the situation, culture, dynamics, 
and participants to ensure there is full preparation for COIN operations. Within the first 
tenet, there are other aspects of consideration: sociocultural knowledge, or an 
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understanding of how and why the society interacts; understanding host nation partners, 
their capabilities, and how they interact with the population; preparation for a long term 
commitment; and learning and adapting, which is critical to an ongoing understanding of 
the OE.137 Ultimately this is all an intellectual preparation to ensure that an effective COIN 
strategy can be employed.  
The recruitment point cost for DIMEFIL Cards are reduced by one.  
COIN Tenet - Developing the COIN Narrative which aims to overcome and 
overwhelm the resistance or insurgent narrative.138 Given that the interaction between the 
insurgent and counterinsurgent is a struggle for legitimacy and support of the population, 
each side will inherently have to a narrative, or storyline, to further their objectives. This 
means that careful thought must occur to display the credibility of the counterinsurgent, 
attack the shortcomings and mistakes of the resistance or insurgency, and capitalize on 
successes of the legitimate government.  
The Local Government gains one legitimacy point for every engagement where Guerrilla 
Fighters are completely removed from a space or when a space comes under the control 
of the Counterinsurgent. This is not applicable if the insurgent withdraws. This is only 
applicable to one (1) urban location and/or two (2) suburban locations. 
COIN Tenet – “Primacy of Politics” is designed to ensure that a political solution 
is found to end the insurgency.139 The goals of a resistance or insurgency are political in 
nature. While military action will take primacy in the beginning of the struggle, it cannot 
remain the main focus, as it is the diplomatic or political solution that will result in the end 
of hostilities. 
For every Local Government on the game board at the beginning of the deployment 
phase, the Counter Insurgent gains two additional recruitment points. 
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COIN Tenet “Population Security.”140 During the struggle over power and 
legitimacy, the government and resistance or insurgency find themselves at opposite ends 
of the spectrum, with the population in the middle. It is the population who will ultimately 
determine who wins the struggle, through support to one side or the other. The security of 
the population goes beyond the use of physical security forces, and includes the 
reinforcement of a just rule of law, a fair legal system, and rules of engagement (ROE) of 
security and military forces that prevents further harm to the population.141 Furthermore, 
security of the population means isolating the resistance or insurgency. As described 
before, the components of a resistance or insurgency are the auxiliary, underground, and 
guerrilla force, each of which draws from and is supported by the population. The more 
effectively the counterinsurgent can provide security to the populous, the more effectively 
it can isolate the insurgent. 
For every counterinsurgent occupied space where the Security Forces equal to or greater 
than the number of the population at the beginning of the deployment phase, the 
Counterinsurgent gains one additional recruitment point. 
COIN Tenet - “Unity of Command and Unity of Effort,” which describes the 
importance of all forces being under one central command structure to enable that all 
actions and efforts are working towards that same goals.142 Additionally, this tenet focuses 
of the importance of working within the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-
national (JIIM) environment to utilize authorities, expertise, and funding to the fullest 
extent. 
Counterinsurgent wins ties during engagements when Security Forces occupy the same 
space as the Local Government.  
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APPENDIX C. PLAYTESTING QUESTIONNAIRE 
A. PRE-GAME 
Were any of the wargame rules confusing and if so which ones, and why? 
 
Was the read ahead scenario sufficient in depicting a complete background in preparation 
for playing the wargame? If not, what would you add or subtract from the read ahead packet 
in order to improve player situational awareness prior to the start of the wargame? 
 
What recommendations or changes would you implement in order to improve player 
preparation prior to the start of the wargame? 
B. GAME PLAY 
What elements of the wargame were effective in helping you understand insurgent and 
counterinsurgent strategies? 
 
What elements of the wargame were not effective in helping you understand insurgent and 
counterinsurgent strategies? 
 
How would you improve the wargame board in order to present a more logical and coherent 
environment? 
 
Were the requirements for winning the wargame achievable given the rules, strategies, and 
capabilities afforded to you as a player? If not, how would you alter the conditions to win 
in order to make them more achievable? 
 
What player capabilities or game mechanics would you add or subtract in order to better 
influence the other players strategy? 
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C. POST-GAME PLAY 
What parts of the wargame would you modify in order to improve their functionality? 
 
What parts of the wargame would you eliminate? 
 
How would you modify the aspect of time (Days, Months, Years) per player turn in the 
wargame in order to better replicate the duration of an insurgency and counter insurgency 
campaign?  
D. OVERALL GAME PLAY 
Is there any part of the wargame (design, gameplay, rules) that you would change that has 
not been covered in the previous questions? 
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APPENDIX D. REBELS AND STATES IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN 
STATES 
While Rebels and States was designed primarily to be used as a teaching tool for 
individuals unfamiliar with the fundamental strategies of UW and COIN, a secondary 
objective is to provide a planning tool for military units preparing to deploy. Currently the 
U.S. military is sending units into the Middle East, which has significant insurgent activity. 
This appendix will provide examples for how the wargame Rebels and States can be set up or 
modified to reflect the modern-day conditions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. These three 
countries have been selected because they have significant presence of forward deployed U.S. 
troops with 8,600 in Afghanistan, 5,200 in Iraq, and 500 in Syria.143  
As any wargame is an abstraction of reality, the modifications proposed in this 
appendix are also abstractions designed to best reflect the physical and human terrain of each 
country. With such abstractions in place, it must be understood that the wargame will not 
provide detailed analytical answers to solve specific problems within any given country or 
within the region as a whole. The wargame will, however, provide a mechanism for unit 
leaders to experiment with potential strategies or distribution of forces. For individuals with 
little experience in the region, the wargame can serve as a way to introduce soldiers to the 
area of operations. With the following modifications for the Middle East region, Rebels and 
States will provide players with a method to conduct experiential learning and begin to explore 
the region, ask questions, and prepare for their mission long before they step foot into a 
country.  
A. AFGHANISTAN VERSION OF REBELS AND STATES 
The United States initiated combat operations in Afghanistan in response to the attacks 
on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. Since the invasion, the war in Afghanistan 
has gone through three phases: the offensive operations to remove the Taliban, rebuilding the 
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Afghan government, and a counterinsurgency campaign to stabilize the country.144 As of 
September 2020, the Taliban insurgency continues despite several U.S. attempts to deliver a 
peace settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban. The physical and human 
terrain of Afghanistan will be analyzed and converted into rules for Rebels and States so 
players can create a gameboard that reflects the current Taliban insurgency and the 
counterinsurgent efforts of the United States. 
1. Afghanistan Physical Terrain 
Afghanistan is a country covered predominantly by the rugged mountains of the 
Hindu Kush with arid plains in the north and southwest. See Figure 19 for reference.  
 
Figure 19. Physiographic Map of Afghanistan, 2009.145 
 
144 Griff Witte, “Afghanistan War: History, Combatants, Facts, & Timeline,” Encyclopedia 
Britannica, September 16, 2020, https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War. 




The proposed wargame board (Figure 20) reflects the physical terrain represented 
in Figure 19. It must be noted that this proposed wargame board does not include the seven 
water hexagon spaces and one unrestricted space that was included in the original version 
of Rebels and States. As Afghanistan is landlocked without major bodies of water, these 
spaces were left out.  
 
Figure 20. Afghanistan Gameboard for Rebels and States 
a. Afghanistan Human Terrain 
As Afghanistan has been in the midst of conflict since 2001, reliable census data 
is difficult to generate and therefore all population figures for the wargames are derived 
from estimations. According to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 
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the estimated total population of Afghanistan in 2014–2015 is 26,556,754 individuals.146 
Figure 21 demonstrates the estimated demographics of the country by province.  
 
Figure 21. Afghanistan Population Distribution, 2014–2015.147 
The small map located in the bottom right corner in Figure 21 with estimations of 
population by province was used to replicate population numbers for each respective space 
within the wargame. While the hexagonal spaces do not directly correlate to the varying 
shapes of each Afghan province, the location of the population spaces can help clearly 
 
146 “Afghanistan: Central Statistics Organization (CSO) Estimated Population 2014–2015 - 
Afghanistan,” ReliefWeb, August 29, 2015, https://reliefweb.int/map/afghanistan/afghanistan-central-
statistics-organization-cso-estimated-population-2014-2015. 
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identify densely populated areas that often correlate to strategic terrain. For example, the 
capital of Kabul is indicated by the population number 6. While the province of Herat has 
a large population, the population indicator of 6 was located approximately where Kabul 
is located to reflect the density of Afghan government power and influence that are 
centralized in the Afghan capital. The strategically important cities of Kandahar, Herat, 
Ghazni, and Kunduz were given population values of 5 and 4 to reflect their strategic value 
to both the Afghan government as well as to the insurgent Taliban.  
  
Figure 22. Afghanistan Population Distribution for Rebels and States 
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b. Afghan Political, Social, Economic, Security, and Information 
Environments 
A primary step to Rebels and States is establishing the initial environment for the 
wargame. This is represented in a total of five environment card categories: Politics, 
Society, Economics, Media, and Security Forces. The appropriate card that best represents 
the current Afghan environment will be selected and discussed.  
(1) Political Environment Card 
The political environment card “Democracy” will be selected, which states the 
following:  
The state is designed to function well, giving the people the ability to 
exercise direct power over heads of state and all matters. Yet it has suffered 
at times from the population’s perception of politics, resulting in constant 
reforms. Insurgent starts with two (2) undergrounds that can be placed at a 
2 or below. 
The current Afghan government was established in 2004 under a constitution that 
provides for a directly elected president with two vice presidents.148 However, there is an 
argument to be made that Afghanistan in reality represents more of a religious oligarchy 
where a group of religious elites make critical national decisions in the forms of Loya Jirga, 
a specially convened national assembly.149 For the purposes of the wargame, however, the 
fact that democracy environment card provides the insurgent with two headquarters units 
(underground forces) better reflects the fact that the Taliban have well established 
leadership networks, especially in rural areas where the Afghan government is limited in 
its ability to assert authority or control over the population.  
(2) Social Environment Card 
The social environment card “Glass Society” will be selected, which states the 
following: 
There seems to be fragile peace between the classes, but a hesitance to trust 
outsiders. The upper class seems to flaunt their money through handouts. 
 




The lower class has animosity towards the rich. The middle class just tries 
to keep the status quo.  No advantage.  
This social environment card is selected to reflect the immense variety and 
differences that separate the numerous ethnic and tribal identities that make up Afghan 
society. The non-homogeneous nature of Afghan society is a feature that does advantage 
the Taliban insurgency, who often uses social variation to prevent the Afghan government 
from unifying the population. This advantage, however, does not warrant a significant 
starting bonus for the insurgent as the varying social identities also hinders the Taliban 
from providing a unified alternative government option to all the respective tribes.  
(3) Security Environment Card 
The security environment card “volunteer” will be selected, which states the 
following:  
No mandatory service. Every person can make their own way through the 
ranks. This allows the security forces to focus on quality over quantity, 
making in a force to be reckoned with. It is seen as a pure example of what 
society could be. COIN player is allowed to re-roll their lowest dice on the 
first three engagements. 
The volunteer environment card reflects the status of the Afghan armed forces. 
Despite the inherent problems of corruption and inconsistency in the Afghan military, the 
army is one of the few government institutions capable of projecting power in key regions 
of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Kunduz. The essential caveat to the Afghan military’s 
ability to project power is due to influence from the international community in the form 
of Operation Resolute Support.150 Without this external support, the Afghan military 
would not be able to project influence throughout Afghanistan. Despite the projected 
reductions in U.S. troops, the Afghan military is still receiving external assistance and 
therefore, the “volunteer” card bonus for the counterinsurgent during engagements is 
adequate for the initial wargame setup.  
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(4) Economy Environment Card 
The economy environment card “capitalist” will be selected which states the 
following: 
This economic system allows the private owner to produce and operate on 
their own for profit. It also somewhat regulates the prices and wages. 
Private ownership means private ventures so long as they stay under the 
government’s radar. Insurgent receives two (2) auxiliaries. 
Extensive economic foreign assistance from the Soviet Union and the U.S. has 
created a modern Afghan economy that reflects a capitalist system when related to foreign 
trade, mining, and some other profitable industries.151 For the purposes of Rebels and 
States, the capitalist card reflects the insurgent’s advantage in the rural economy especially 
in regards to opiate production and timber harvesting along with other illicit services that 
continue to fund the Taliban. While the Afghan government receives substantial economic 
support from the international community, the corruption and financial mismanagement 
places the counterinsurgent at a significant disadvantage in the wargame.  
(5) Media Environment Card 
The media environment card “skeptical” will be selected which states the 
following: 
The media reports everything, but always with a grain of salt. There are no 
winners in this reporting, because everything has a sense of a conspiracy 
tied to it. It’s not tied to any party or class. It’s almost as if it wants to 
create suspense within the audience. No advantage. 
Since the Taliban’s demise, the local press has substantially increased with new 
publications. Dozens of newspapers and magazines have appeared and the low literacy rate 
is off set by the long-standing tradition of reading newspapers aloud that has greatly 
expanded the number of Afghans who have access to the printed word.152 The increase in 
Afghan reporting is also supported by increased access to digital media through wireless 
communications. The skeptical environment card reflects the initial game state where 
 




neither the insurgent nor counterinsurgent has a significant advantage in the information 
space.  
B. SYRIAN VERSION OF REBELS AND STATES 
The conflict in Syria began in 2011 with a peaceful domestic uprising, but turned 
into a violent conflict when President Bashar al-Assad brutally responded, causing 
significant upheaval in the region.153 A critical challenge in the Syrian conflict is the 
interactions of multiple actors within the country. A rudimentary summary of these actors 
includes: the Islamic State (IS), the Syrian government, Syrian Kurds, Syrian Opposition 
Forces, Turkey, the United States, and Russia.154 Rebels and States is designed as a two-
player game however, this presents an opportunity to both convert the map and modify the 
game structure to account for multiple players. Both the modifications to the game board 
to account for physical terrain and a proposal for incorporating different players will be 
discussed in order to account for the unique conflict dynamics in Syria.  
1. Syrian Physical Terrain  
The landscape of Syria is predominantly a semiarid and desert plateau with a 
narrow coastal plain and a series of mountain ranges in the west. Syria borders the countries 
of Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. See the following map (Figure 23) as a 
reference for the physical terrain of the country.  
 
153 Michael Singh et al., Syria Study Group Final Report and Recommendations (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute for Peace, 2019), 4, https://permanent.fdlp.gov/gpo126197/syria-study-group-final-
report.pdf. 




Figure 23. CIA Physiographic Map of Syria, 2007.155 
Figure 24 represents how to array the hexagonal spaces to reflect the physical 
terrain of the country to create the Syria version of the Rebels and States wargame board. 
As the hexagonal pieces are limited to the 30 original hexes of Rebels and States, the array 
of desert hexes on the wargame board is not directly proportional to the great expanse of 
desert that is along the southern border of Syria. The proposed wargame board (Figure 24) 
is a substantial abstraction in this regard but will not hinder the overall gameplay as this 
reflects a mostly unpopulated region of Syria.  
 





Figure 24. Syria Gameboard for Rebels and States 
2. Syrian Human Terrain 
The conflict in Syria has significantly decreased the population as over 5 million 
refugees fled the fighting between 2011 and 2018.156 Demographic maps (Figure 25) 
indicate that a predominant portion of the Syrian population resides in the western regions 
of the country with significant concentrations in the major cities of Aleppo and Damascus 
with populations over 1.5 million people.157 
 
156 “Syria Population 2020,” World Population Review, September 18, 2020, 
https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/syria-population. 




Figure 25. Syria Population Distribution, 2002.158 
The proposed Rebels and States wargame board (Figure 26) for Syria reflects the 
substantial population located in the western regions of the country. While Damascus and 
Aleppo are nearly equal in population, Damascus is indicated by the population number of 
6 to reflect its status as the capital of the country. The zero population numbers located in 
the south and eastern portion of the wargame board are designed to reflect the emptiness 
of the southern Syrian desert. While there is an argument to account for the strategic 
importance of the oil fields located in the southern Syrian desert, this particular population 
wargame board design is focused on population centers as opposed to critical 
infrastructure.  
 
158 Source: David Dean Commins, “Syria - Settlement Patterns,” Encyclopedia Britannica, September 




Figure 26. Syrian Population Distribution for Rebels and States 
3. Representing Active Forces Within the Syrian Conflict 
The Syrian conflict involves a complicated blend of forces and international actors 
that must be accounted for in a Syrian version of Rebels and States. A simplification of the 
insurgent and counterinsurgent actors within Syria can equate to three forces consisting of 
the Syrian government, Syrian Kurds, and Syrian opposition forces. Russia and the United 
States do have a military presence within the conflict; however, these are only a small 
number of advisors so for the purposes of the wargame do not constitute a large enough 
force to merit two additional and separate players. Turkey does have a significant military 
presence and is aligned with Syrian militias; however, the Turkish intervention is based on 
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“stopping the Syrian regimes massacre as well as radical groups and the displacement of 
civilians.”159 This does not align with the intent of the wargame to establish predominant 
influence in the entire country and therefore only the three forces of Syrian government, 
Syrian Kurds, and Syrian opposition forces will be included as players within the wargame. 
The Islamic State is also not included in this example as they have become a latent 
insurgency and do not hold enough significant terrain to be included in this proposed 
wargame board. If players wish to add the Islamic State as an additional insurgency, then 
they can simply add the player without limitations on where they can be initially arrayed 
before the first turn of the wargame. Leaving Turkey and IS out of this example is a 
significant abstraction from reality but it is a necessary modification in order to maintain 
initial wargame playability.  
In order to modify the game to account for the three players as opposed to a two-
player system, two game functions including the initial array of forces and the turn order 
of operations must be modified. These modifications do not alter the core rules of the game, 
they only alter the starting condition and sequence of alternating turns.  
a. Initial Array of Forces 
The Syrian conflict is made more complex by elements of insurgency combined 
with elements of conventional warfare where battle lines have been established between 
opposing forces. The initial array of forces for the three players therefore will be 
predetermined in order to reflect the disposition of the Syrian government, Syrian Kurds, 
and Syrian Opposition Forces in 2019. 
 
159 Jen Kirby, “Why Turkey Launched a Major Offensive Against the Syrian Government,” Vox, 




Figure 27. Areas of Influence in Syria, May 2019.160 
Using the Areas of Influence map (Figure 27) of Syria as a basis for the initial 
distribution of forces, the locations in Figure 28 are predesignated for the initial array of 
forces. Syrian government forces would be restricted initially arraying forces in the areas 
designated in red that are located predominantly in southwestern Syria. Syrian opposition 
forces would be restricted to initially arraying their forces in the areas designated in the 
two green areas located in northern and southern Syria. Syrian Kurds would be restricted 
in their initial array of forces to the areas indicated in blue in northeast Syria. From these 
initial positions, players can begin to assert their influence and navigate potential future 
outcomes of the conflict.  
 




Figure 28. Initial Array of Forces for Syrian Version of Rebels and States  
b. Three Player Turn Order of Operations 
An essential element to modifying Rebels and States into a three-player game 
requires adaptations to the sequence in which players put their forces on the board and then 
alternate turns between players. In the two-player version of Rebels and States, the 
counterinsurgent player arrays their forces first followed by the insurgent player. For the 
proposed three player version of Rebels and States, the Syrian Government player will be 
the counterinsurgent and would place their forces first. The Syrian Kurds and Syrian 
Opposition player will function as the insurgents and therefore will both roll a dice. The 
player with the lowest dice roll will establish their forces after the Syrian government 
player is finished, followed by the player with the highest dice roll. The randomization of 
the dice roll is necessary in establishing a clear order of arraying forces onto the board. 
While this offers the player who arrays their forces last a slight advantage, the fact that all 
players initial deployment areas are restricted limits this advantage.  
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In the original version of Rebels and States, the insurgent player gets the first turn 
which then alternates between counterinsurgent and insurgent. In the three player Syrian 
version of Rebels and States with one counterinsurgent and two insurgents, it will be 
necessary to establish a randomized turn sequence between the three players to represent 
the capricious nature of combat operations in modern day Syria. Each game turn will 
consist of three player turns that will be randomly decided by the roll of a dice. The highest 
dice roll of the three can elect to go first, second or third in the game turn sequence. The 
next highest dice roll of the three can choose between the remaining two positions in the 
game sequence and the lowest dice roll gets the final remaining position. This process will 
be repeated for every new game turn. This randomization and change in player turns during 
each subsequent game turn simulates the constant change of initiative and advantage within 
the Syrian conflict. While the dice roll randomizes the method for choosing the player turn 
order during each game turn, the players who choose the appropriate player turn position 
will significantly maximize their advantage within the wargame.  
C. IRAQ VERSION OF REBELS AND STATES 
Iraq presents a Middle Eastern case study for insurgency where a once unified and 
relatively powerful country was destroyed by a global power in a large conventional war 
and the reconstruction effort failed due to the subsequent insurgency. In comparison to 
Afghanistan and Syria, Iraq has a more stable physical infrastructure and political system 
and therefore presents an opportunity to modify Rebels and States to assess an established, 
albeit weak, Middle Eastern government dealing with a strong insurgency supported by 
powerful external actors. Despite the recent destruction of the territorial caliphate, the 
Islamic State has successfully transitioned into a well-entrenched and active insurgency 
that has taken advantage of the Iraqi governments problematic decisions to bolster their 
narrative.161 A key element of conflict in Iraq is the sectarian divide between Sunni and 
Shia. This section will propose both a method for generating the physical and human terrain 
 
161 Zachary Cleary, “A Return to Insurgency in Iraq: The Islamic State’s Transition to Insurgency and 
the Iraqi Mistakes That Have Aided It,” The Illini Journal Of International Security 5, no. 1 (January 28, 
2020): 38, https://katla.cites.illinois.edu/index.php/IJOIS/article/view/638. 
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of Iraq for Rebels and States and an additional game mechanic to account for the divide 
between Sunni and Shia in the insurgent conflict.  
1. Iraq Physical Terrain 
The geography of Iraq is dominated by desert in the west and southwest with rolling 
terrain and plains between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and highlands in the northeast. 
Using the 2008 CIA Iraq physiography map (Figure 29) as a reference, the gameboard 
(Figure 30) is proposed to simulate the physical terrain of Iraq.  
 
Figure 29. Physiographic Map of Iraq, 2008.162 
 





Figure 30. Iraq Gameboard for Rebels and States  
Due to the predominance of unrestricted desert terrain in Iraq, the proposed 
wargame board converts three severely restricted mountain hexagons into three 
unrestricted desert hexagons. For these proposed wargame boards, every effort is designed 
to use as much of the original gameboard as possible in order to reduce additional 
construction requirements on the players. The conversion of hexagon terrain spaces in this 
case is a necessary requirement in order to create a board that adequately reflects the 
physical terrain of Iraq.  
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2. Iraq Human Terrain 
The population of Iraq is located predominantly in the central, eastern and northern 
regions of the country in the Tigris and Euphrates river valleys.  
 
Figure 31. Iraq Population Density, 2016.163 
The proposed wargame board for the Iraq version of Rebels and States (Figure 32) 
follows the particularly concentrated nature of the Iraq population. The capital Baghdad is 
indicated with population marker of six. The major cities of Mosul, Erbil and Basrah are 
indicated with a population marker of 5.  
 






Figure 32. Iraq Population Distribution for Rebels and States 
3. Game Modifications to Reflect the Sunni and Shia Divide 
The Iraq version of Rebels and States would be best served with a game 
modification that represents the sectarian conflict that arises from the division between 
Sunni and Shia Muslims within the country. In order to account for this, a generic game 
rule will be applied to reflect how either the insurgent or counterinsurgent gains advantages 
or disadvantages based on the predominance of either a Sunni or Shia population. The Iraqi 
version of Rebels and States has the insurgent player representing the IS insurgency and 
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the counterinsurgent player representing the Iraqi government. Because of the social, 
judicial, and economic abuses against the Sunni population by the Iraqi government, areas 
with predominant Sunni populations will serve as recruiting grounds and support areas for 
the IS insurgency.164 Conversely, the Iraqi government has predominantly been an 
institution that supports Shia initiatives and therefore will have an advantage within the 
wargame in areas with a Shia majority.165 It is noted that the new Iraqi prime minister, 
Mustafa Al-Kadhimi, intends to unite the different Iraqi groups in the new government, 
however, the Iraqi government and IS will still have to overcome the historic divide 
between both Sunni and Shia in order to reach their separate objectives.166 Therefore, the 
following rule is proposed to reflect the sectarian divide within Iraq: 
 
Insurgent: In order to establish an auxiliary or underground within a space 
with a Shia majority, the insurgent player must pay one additional 
recruitment point.  
 
Counterinsurgent: In order to establish an essential service or underground 
within a space with a Sunni majority, the counterinsurgent player must pay 
one additional recruitment point.  
 
The additional imposed cost to both support and headquarters units for both players 
will reinforce the lesson that areas with a significant religious majority have a substantial 
impact on the outcome of any insurgent conflict within Iraq. The following map (Figure 
33) indicates the Sunni and Shia divide within the country. 
 
164 Cleary, “A Return to Insurgency in Iraq,” 41. 
165 Cleary, 40. 
166 Nathalie Bussemaker, “Iraq’s New Government: What to Know,” Council on Foreign Relations, 




Figure 33. Ethnic Composition of Iraq.167 
Using Figure 33 as a guide, the following modification to the Iraq version of the 
Rebels and States wargame board (Figure 34) reflects the predominance of either Sunni or 
Shia in the associated hexagonal spaces.  
 





Figure 34. Wargame Board for Rebels and States with Sunni and Shia Modification 
The Sunni and Shia modification for Rebels and States does not incorporate the 
predominant Kurdish population in Northern Iraq because the Kurdish population offers 
no significant advantage or disadvantage to the insurgent and counterinsurgent within the 
context of the proposed wargame modification. If the players wished to incorporate the 
Kurds into the wargame, we propose adding a third player as described in the Syria 
modification (Figure 10) of Rebels and States. The capital of Baghdad is also not included 
in the proposed modification because the capital is on the ethnic dividing line between 
Sunni and Shia of Figure 14 and because of the political authority and concentration of 




The wargame Rebels and States can be modified in order to reflect modern 
insurgent conflicts in the Middle East. The physical and human terrain of Afghanistan was 
analyzed to create a wargame board that reflects the current Afghan insurgency and 
modifications were made to the starting environment cards to represent the two decades of 
conflict. The physical and human terrain of Syria was assessed to create a wargame board 
while modifications to the number of players and turn order of operations were proposed 
to account for the multiple actors within the conflict. The physical and human terrain of 
Iraq was analyzed to create a generic game modification to account for the sectarian 
conflict within the country. It must be noted that each of these game modifications are 
significant abstractions of the reality within the three countries and are designed to enhance 
the context of the wargame. The intent of the modifications is to change the rules of Rebels 
and States in order to reflect particular aspects of the insurgent conflict from which players 
can initiate discussion and assess challenging scenarios. Players can use any combination 
of the proposed modifications if they wish to explore different aspects of the social, 
historical, political, or religious environments of a country within the context of an 
insurgency. However, each modification added creates another layer of complexity which 
can reduce playability of the overall wargame.  
Due to the fragile state of many modern Middle Eastern countries, there remains 
significant potential for insurgent conflict. Global Jihadism according to Glenn Robinson, 
is currently in the “Fourth Wave of Personal Jihad” where the relatively marginal jihadi 
movement is in a state of looming demise.168 This fragile state has the potential to push 
jihadis to establish latent insurgencies as the region continues to destabilize. With the 
potential for continued insurgent conflict within the region, the modifications for the 
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APPENDIX E. CHINESE COIN AND APPLICATION TO REBELS 
AND STATES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To function within the wide array of potential conflict options, a SOF operator must 
thoroughly understand insurgency and counterinsurgency. Thus far, the wargame Rebels 
and States has been focused on a fabricated country that changes from iteration to iteration. 
While Rebels and States is intended to be an educational wargame that introduces the 
baseline theories from the SFQC, it can be altered to play realistic scenarios as well.  
In the era of GPC, and as China’s influence and power grows, it must consider 
utilizing its expanded military might to garner power and authority within INDOPACOM, 
and possibly beyond. China can export its COIN methodology to aid allies in immediate 
and potential conflicts. If USSF are going to be expected to execute its mandated mission 
of UW, and China is the opposing power, then an analysis of Chinese COIN methodology 
and tenets is necessary. Therefore, it is imperative that USSF understand this methodology 
to defeat it, either directly or indirectly, and prevent China from becoming an alternative 
to the U.S. and its allies for security and stability. This appendix answers the following 
questions: What is China’s COIN methodology? Are there tenets that can be drawn from 
this methodology? How can this be translated into Rebels and States to educate players in 
the interaction between insurgency and specifically Chinese COIN? 
This appendix first looks at a brief history of Chinese COIN since 9/11, with the 
focus being on the western province of Xinjiang. Next, Chinese COIN tactics are be 
discussed using the instruments of national power to discuss where and how China places 
emphasis. Third, we propose five key Chinese COIN tenets. Finally, these tenets are 
translated into rules for Rebels and States to give players a more realistic educational 
experience.  
B. RECENT HISTORY OF CHINESE INSURGENCY ISSUES IN XINJIANG 
Xinjiang is home to a large Uighur Muslim population who for centuries saw 
themselves as their own state and governed their own people. Many Chinese dynasties and 
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leaders have attempted to pacify and annex the region, but to this day both the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) and Uighur population lay claim to the region.169 Despite the 
Qing Dynasty successfully unifying China in 1757, the Uighur population still considered 
themselves an autonomous entity, providing the friction that has created centuries on 
conflict.170 The people of Xinjiang first proclaimed their independence as the new country 
of East Turkestan in 1933, establishing itself as decidedly anti-China and becoming a 
“defacto Soviet satellite.”171 In 1942, Xinjiang became a part of China after anti-Soviet 
sentiment grew, but in 1944 Xinjiang again declared independence after trade with the 
Soviet Union was cut off.172 Then, in 1949 Mao Tse Tung unified China after his 
opposition, including the forces in Xinjiang, surrendered.173 Despite Mao and his 
successors numerous attempts to tame the Uighur population in Xinjiang, opposition still 
simmered.  
In the 1980s anti-China sentiment and violence started to increase. China responded 
with the first of its “Strike Hard” campaigns in 1983, which aimed to completely destroy 
the Uighur population.174 The Strike Hard policy imposed “harsh punishment in a swift 
manner on criminals who jeopardize public security and social order,” and targeted 
religious ideology, combining “separatism, terrorism, and extremism” as one in the 
same.175 This campaign only codified the Uighur struggle against the CCP, and when the 
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Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the embers of resistance caught flame again.176 The 
increased insurgent and terrorist activity resulted in a second Strike Hard campaign that 
ended in 1997.177 That same year, China began to expand legal definitions of insurgency 
and terrorism, and in 2001 it truly began to capitalize on the Global War on Terror’s 
(GWOT) momentum of pursuing and eliminating resistance and terror threats.178  
The beginning of GWOT marked a shift in the emphasis China placed in its COIN 
strategy. From 1990—2001 more than 160 people were killed and 440 were injured in 200+ 
acts of insurgency, terrorism, or violence associated with the Uighur population, priming 
China to make respond dramatically.179 The events on 9/11, and the United States’ heavy 
handed reaction, gave China the opportunity to expand its COIN strategy and practice.  
C. CHINESE COIN UTILIZING THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL 
POWER 
The use of DIMEFIL, who controls it, and how it addresses the issues and 
grievances of a population is key to the insurgent versus counterinsurgent struggle. We 
have already incorporated these instruments of national power into Rebels and States due 
to its significance. In the section, we will utilize DIMEFIL to analyze China’s COIN 
tactics, providing examples of how each addresses the Xinjiang insurgency issue. The 
following section will use this analysis to propose tenets of Chinese COIN.   
1. Diplomacy 
As in every insurgent versus counterinsurgent struggle, the battle between the two 
sides is about some form of legitimacy, and in Xinjiang it is no different. The government 
must consider resistance as a threat that must be immediately disposed of before other 
 
176 Englund, “Analysis of China’s Counterinsurgency Strategy in Xinjiang Between 2008 and 2018,” 
39–40. 
177 Laronde, “Protracted Counterinsurgency Chinese COIN Strategy in Xinjiang,” 58. 
178 Li, “China’s New Counterterrorism Legal Framework in the Post-2001 Era,” 355. 
179 Martin I. Wayne, China’s War on Terrorism: Counter- Insurgency, Politics, and Internal Security, 
Asian Security Studies (New York: Routledge, 2008), 42. 
 
130 
secessionist movements make attempts to separate from China.180 In Xinjiang, the political 
struggle has resulted in the CCP’s focus on the “political nature of the threat.”181 As a 
result, domestic and international diplomacy has taken center stage in China’s COIN 
strategy to display the CCP’s ability to overcome the Xinjiang insurgency and garner 
continued support of its people.182 
China’s local level of diplomacy ensure and maintains the CCP’s initiative and 
goals, providing momentum to its overall COIN strategy. In Xinjiang, the local government 
has a two-track system that simultaneously follows the state, only occasionally run by a 
Uighur, and the party, run by a Han Chinese who is slightly superior, when governing the 
region.183 The CCP has co-opted Uighur leaders within the “fangzu system” that 
unofficially sees to the village level concerns; These leaders in turn have received 
economic benefits to ensure the party’s priorities are fulfilled.184 Given the influence of 
the party and government at every level, local leaders err on the side of stability in the eyes 
of the CCP or risk their family or well-being.185 This dual track diplomacy reinforces the 
vision and ideals for CCP’s description of stability.  
Internationally, China has increased its relations with other countries to combat its 
insurgency and terrorism problem. It has “relentlessly pursued” diplomatic relations with 
region countries, such as Pakistan, or organizations, like the Shanghai Cooperation (SCO), 
to expand its COIN strategy.186 With Pakistan, China has provided diplomatic support in 
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exchange for a prevention of anti-China activities finding safe haven in Pakistan.187 The 
SCO, which members include Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan, looks to promote “peace, security, and stability in the region.”188 Their actions 
are COIN and terrorism-focused, with China serving as a permanent and influential 
member. China has capitalized on the diplomatic relations established through the SCO to 
expand their influence, even creating a “joint SCO judicial training center” that 
undoubtedly educates its students in China’s COIN strategy and tactics.189  
2. Information 
Information is critical to China’s COIN effort, both domestically and 
internationally. It is the cornerstone of a strategy that will fall apart if their information 
efforts do not remain effective.190 Information is what drives the message that the CCP 
maintains control of the security in the country, meeting the citizens call for stability, and 
reinforces President Xi’s priority of national unity.191 China’s use of information has three 
themes: a people’s struggle, information control, and educational development. 
The theme that COIN in China is a “people’s struggle” nests neatly within citizens’ 
call for stability because it immediately places responsibility back on the citizens 
themselves. The CCP regularly uses internet service providers (ISPs) to filter and 
disseminate information and report on any suspicious insurgent and terrorist activity.192 
The residents of Xinjiang are called upon to monitor the tens of thousands of security 
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cameras within the province, while also applying a “social credit” system to score citizens 
based on their economic and social behavior in an attempt to reinforce individual and 
collective accountability.193 Citizens from outside of the troubled province are asked and 
incentivized to move to Xinjiang for the purposes of economic development, education, 
and monitoring in a modified “domestic peace corps” type structure.194 By putting the 
responsibility back on citizens the CCP effectively reinforces the “sociopolitical feedback 
loop” that strengthens the government’s standing in the eyes of the citizens who call for 
increased security by merely supporting ground level efforts.195 
The CCP also has gone to great lengths in controlling the information within 
troubled areas, from manipulating media and messaging to fundamentally changing the 
perception of entire populations. The local government can, and has, censored and filtered 
all forms of information within a province, even going so far as to shutting down internet 
for extended periods.196 Furthermore, the CCP controls who receives press credentials to 
ensure only approved news stories are published.197 Besides controlling what messages 
and information are disseminated, entire campaigns of labelling the Uighur population 
have been produced beyond that of terrorists or insurgents. The way of thinking of the 
citizens of Xinjiang has been given a medical theme, where the population is in the midst 
of a “serious health crisis,” where the “tumors need to be eradicated” before it becomes a 
larger issue.198 This control of information and reframing of populations emphasizes the 
insurgency issue and support of the rest of the population. 
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The CCP also uses education as a means to suppress or even extinguish any thought 
of institutional resistance using a “transformation through education” approach.199 Its 
main approach is through the use of re-education, where entire Uighur populations are 
taught approved ideological and political subjects in an attempt to “overwrite ethic and 
cultural autonomy,” keeping in line with the nationalistic theme.200 In another attempt to 
suppress culture and ethnicity, higher level education is only taught in Mandarin, forcing 
students to learn the official Chinese language and forgo their native tongue.201 Even when 
not completely suppressing the Uighur Muslim culture, the CCP will only “certify” 
government trained Imams to serve as the leaders who provide religious education and 
interpretation.202 The CCP’s control of information through education has a wholistic 
approach to suppressing anything that falls outside of its approved message. 
3. Military and Law Enforcement 
Since the CCP combines military and law enforcement, we will do the same for its 
analysis, but will break down this analysis into military and law enforcers, or the CCP’s 
use of its personnel and equipment, and law, or the CCP’s adjustment of its domestic laws 
to support its COIN approach.  
Among the military and law enforcers breakdown there are again domestic and 
international considerations. The domestic considerations use a “4 in one” system that 
involves the use of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s Armed Police (PAP), 
the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), and the ordinary citizen.203 Each 
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serves a role within the COIN strategy. While the PLA initially found itself on the COIN 
front line, it has since moved to the frontier areas of Xinjiang, focusing more on border 
security, less on confrontation with insurgents, and providing support to paramilitary and 
security forces.204 Consequently, the PAP has taken on the role on internal security, law 
enforcement, and COIN.205 The PAP serves not only as law enforcement, but also as a 
paramilitary organization that supports the PLA in times of war, and “armed wing” of the 
CCP.206 The XPCC is a multifaceted paramilitary organization that “run schools, publish 
newspapers, have their own courts, police, and prisons” focused specifically on 
Xinjiang.207 Just as described in the information section, the people and citizens also serve 
a role in the military and enforcement system as well, either by joining paramilitary 
organizations, serving as stewards of the CCP, or providing information and intelligence 
to authorities. This system allows the military, law enforcement, and citizens to have local 
through national level support when fighting insurgency. 
China’s international involvement with its neighbors includes multi-lateral 
cooperation, intelligence and information sharing, military exercises, and other 
collaborative actions. China, and its fellow SCO members have built a structure to mutually 
support each other’s efforts. It is this organization that coined the “three evils” of 
extremism, terrorism, and separatism.208 They bring together different entities for training 
and exercises that regularly results in the exchange of information and intelligence.209 
Outside of the SCO, China and Pakistan have incredibly close military ties that have seen 
the two countries support each other’s COIN efforts, exchange information and experts, 
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and develop more effective measures.210 This cooperation among neighbors during COIN 
campaigns undoubtedly strengthens military developments and effectiveness. 
Since 2001, China has actively changed its laws to support its COIN efforts. Its 
laws are also intertwined with its information efforts. After the United State began to 
expand the insurgent and terrorism definitions after 9/11, the CCP successfully did the 
same with Uighur separatists and other minority groups.211 Now, so long as an action falls 
within one of the “three evils” it is considered an issue of national security, which in turn 
receives the focus of resources agencies who look to employ their hard power.212 Also 
immediately after 9/11, China passed laws that cast a wide net over what is considered 
terrorist acts.213 This gave law enforcement expanded powers when conducting police 
practices, resulting in an expansion of imprisonment based on questionable, at best, 
evidence and mass detention into “re-education” camps.214 Furthermore, the expanding 
definitions of insurgent and terror activities to “safeguard the security of the State and 
people’s lives” has resulted in a blanket declaration that any Uighur organizations have 
linkages to global terrorism.215 Consequently, if the wide definitions that generally only 
have to fall within one of the “three evils” is the cause, then the effect is the use of force 
against any person or people that do not behave strictly within what the government deems 
as acceptable. 
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4. Economic and Financial 
While not as overwhelmingly prevalent, the economic and financial aspects of 
China’s COIN strategy still play an important role, especially as a means to promote the 
use of other instruments of national power. The CCP has invested heavily in Xinjiang to 
raise the standard of living; in turn creating more comfortable living conditions and ideally 
hamstring insurgent grievances.216 This heavy investment in the region has created 
opportunities to tap into the “estimated 21 billion tons of oil reserves, 40% of the national 
coal reserves, and largest national gas reserves in the country.”217  
The opportunities for economic growth and wealth seemingly have a positive 
impact for those who get involved. However, these prospects are being used by the CCP to 
ensure development is correlated with its COIN strategy. As infrastructure projects and 
communities are created, Han Chinese are awarded construction contracts, top 
administrative positions, and new housing.218 Local educators, who are rewarded with 
social recognition and a decent salary, run the risk of losing their status and even being 
arrested if they deviate from approved curriculums.219 Profits from natural resources 
bypass the locals and either make their way to Beijing or enrich the Han Chinese, who have 
an average 68% higher income than the Uighur population in the region.220 Economic and 
financial incentives have been indirectly weaponized to reinforce the CCP’s goals. 
5. Intelligence 
China’s use of intelligence is far reaching, invasive, and ultimately proven 
effective.221 China’s COIN strategy is heavily reliant on intelligence to identify insurgent 
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actions and organization before their plans can come to fruition.222 Its intelligence 
apparatus has two disciplines: technical intelligence (TECHINT) and human intelligence 
(HUMINT).223 These work in concert to provide timely information to military and law 
enforcement, even if the accuracy is questionable.  
China has effectively utilized TECHINT and its populations growing technical 
reliance to monitor all aspects of life. ISPs are critical to disseminating and filtering 
information to the masses. These same ISPs, by law, are required to have monitoring 
programs in place, provide technical and decryption support, and assist any public security 
apparatus in the prevention the “three evils.”224 Further TECHINT practices, aside from 
the video surveillance monitoring, include phone surveillance, mobile positioning, and 
email examination.225 As society continues to increase its reliance on technology, China’s 
TECHINT practices and capabilities will undoubtedly increase in its effectiveness. 
The use of HUMINT is also closely intertwined with China’s idea of a “people’s 
struggle” and their use of party trained and approved personnel, such as the Imams or 
“peace corps” types, migrating to problem areas. There are groups of cadre that live with 
the people of Xinjiang, likely already identified as threats to the security of the state, for 
“at least five days every two months,” participate in social events, and acts as sensors for 
within the security apparatus, closely monitoring everyday life.226 The military and law 
enforcement has large networks of assets and agents “inside educational and religious 
institutions, social and ethnic circles, industries, and farmlands.”227 Normally HUMINT 
is a dangerous and tricky business that requires extensive vetting, but China’s use of its 
citizens in the struggle seemingly provides an endless quantity of willing participants to 
root out any dissent. 
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D. PROPOSED CHINESE COIN TENETS 
The elements of national power and the examples therein provide insight into the 
means or tactics of China’s COIN strategy. Yet, tactics alone cannot achieve success unless 
they are nested within an operational plan and strategy. Just as within U.S. COIN doctrine, 
principles, or tenets, are the guideposts that drive the actions of the counterinsurgent. They 
serve as a bridge between tactics and strategy to ensure a unified effort. This section 
proposes five tenets based on the tactics described in the DIMEFIL analysis: Social Class 
Warfare, Changing the Legal Framework, The People’s Fight, Compulsory Education, and 
Coercive Narratives. 
1. Social Class Warfare 
The first Chinese COIN tenet we propose is Social Class Warfare, which we define 
as warfare using economics, information, and legal practices to build up one social class to 
either suppress or completely vanquish another. In the case of China, Social Class Warfare 
is being waged using the Han Chinese to suppress the Uighurs. Furthermore, there is not 
specific targeting of Uighur insurgents, but rather a wide net cast over the entire population. 
A Xinjiang official reportedly stated that “You can’t uproot all the weeds hidden among 
the crops in the field one by one- you need to spray chemicals to kill them all.”228 We have 
already discussed examples of this approach in the individual DIMEFIL analysis, but this 
tenet is focused on all tactics used to support the Han Chinese and suppress the Uighurs. 
China’s support to Han Chinese makes it seem that its strategy is one of benign 
improvement in the area, but deeper analysis brings to light a more sinister truth. Due to 
the influx of Han Chinese, military and paramilitary forces receive more recruits, 
enhancing military and law enforcement capabilities.229 The investment within Xinjiang 
has created economic opportunities that have been capitalized on by Han Chinese 
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businessmen.230 These examples, coupled with others described in our DIMEFIL analysis 
have resulted in the Han holding most, if not all, power and control over the instruments 
of national power against the Uighur population.231 
Conversely, suppression of the Uighur population, where it is believed the 
insurgent and terrorist organizations reside, is the other side aspect of this strategy. Their 
population is considered the number one public enemy because of its resistance to give in 
to the CCP’s actions.232 The migration of Han Chinese degrades the political influence the 
Uighurs.233 China’s higher educational policies of teaching in Mandarin or influence over 
media and literature is systematically dismantling the Uighur culture.234 This two-pronged 
approach of support and suppression using social classes is the foundation of this tenet. 
2. Changing the Legal Framework 
The Chinese COIN tenet we propose is Changing the Legal Framework to meet the 
desired endstate. If tactics are considered illegal or legally abstruse, then China will change 
its laws to fit the tactics that will drive toward meeting objectives. China has greatly 
expanded the definition of insurgency and terrorism while also expanding the authorities 
of law enforcement. The definition of resistance includes ambiguously defined “other 
terrorist acts,” while other illegal actions surround the Uighur religious practices that 
conflict with state defined regulation.235 Furthermore, the fact that the CCP declares all 
Uighur social organizations as terrorists with links to global terrorism not only epitomizes 
the broad definitions established by law, it also opens the door for a wide variety of actions 
that can be taken by law enforcement and military, while reinforces the example in our first 
tenet of suppressing the Uighur population.236 China has undoubtedly capitalized on its 
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ability to quickly adjusted its legal structure to isolate and destroy the broad definitions of 
its enemies. 
3. The People’s Fight 
The third tenet we propose builds upon Martin Wayne’s idea of grassroots change 
and coincides with “people’s struggle” described in the information analysis.237 In an 
almost prophetic way, China plays on Mao Tse Tung’s idea of a “people’s war.” The 
People’s Fight focuses on action at the lowest level with support coming from the top. 
While the citizens of a nation inherently rely on the state to provide security, China has 
written in legislation that countering insurgency and terrorism is the duty of its people.238 
As the people aid the state, the enemies are “suppressed by the state’s enforcement bodies 
and people…are well protected.”239 This effort includes strengthening “grassroots 
institutions,” through the dual track system outlined in the diplomacy section, to prevent 
infiltration of insurgents into the political decision making and security apparatus.240 
Furthermore, an intensive information campaign, competent and effective law enforcement 
and military, and financial incentives also strengthen diplomatic efforts and increase 
intelligence accuracy and reporting. The usefulness of the instruments of national power 
are increased when convincing the people that the fight is their own. 
4. Compulsory Education 
The fourth Chinese COIN tenet we propose is Compulsory Education. This 
includes the use of traditional education, such as primary or advanced schooling, and re-
education. China has ingeniously used education as a three faceted approach to counter its 
insurgent problem. First, the use of only Mandarin in higher education dissolves the Uighur 
language and culture.241 Second, it educates students and employs teachers that 
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disseminate the CCP’s approved history lessons, goals of the future, and ideals of 
responsible living. Third, by opening up education opportunities to its insurgent 
populations, it can highlight problematic minority groups as “ungrateful” for the prospects 
of better future when they do not assimilate; this build resentment among the larger 
population against these groups and only strengthens the CCP’s narratives.242  
While education is a seemingly proactive approach, re-education is reactive in 
nature, involves mass incarceration of minority groups, and serves as means to forcibly 
change the mind of minority groups, through the threat of their life or “freedom” in most 
cases. China is clearly not shy about using this tactic, reportedly detaining anywhere from 
1 to 3 million people for re-education.243 It considers extremism the foundation of 
resistance and, therefore, the way of thinking must be changed to fall in line with a “proper” 
ideological and political mindset.244 This tenet attacks a resistance’s way of thinking to 
ensure it conforms with the counterinsurgent’s narrative and strategy. 
5. Coercive Narratives 
Narratives are key to any insurgent versus counterinsurgent struggle, and China’s 
COIN strategy is no different. Consequently, our proposed final Chinese COIN tenet is 
Coercive Narratives and centers around the use of information. We provided numerous 
examples of how this tenet is approached during the DIMEFIL analysis. Furthermore, 
China uses coercion, such as threats against reporters and scare tactics, and persuasion, like 
bribery or financial investments, to ensure the “party line” is adhered to and reinforced.245 
The combination of control over the media, the “people’s struggle” the CCP’s ability to 
provide security and stability, and message of an ungrateful and problematic minority 
group play a crucial role in defeating the Uighur insurgency.  
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E. CHINESE COIN IN REBELS AND STATES 
To incorporate Chinese COIN into Rebels and States two modifications are 
necessary. First, only the wargame should use only China’s COIN strategy, including our 
proposed tenets and their bonuses. Second, the DIMEFIL cards should be modified to fit 
the analysis of this chapter. The structure of the game board and the environment are not 
required by the players. 
Using China’s COIN tactics and methodology as a guide, the starting/winning 
conditions and tenets are the main modifications to Rebels and States. To simulate the 
control of major population centers, the new starting condition requires that the COIN 
player can only establish forces in urban spaces. The nationalist ideals and paranoia over 
losing additional regions has resulted in a complete suppression and no compromise 
mentality for the CCP. This makes for a difficult winning condition. For Rebels and States, 
the additional winning condition is to control all urban spaces, control the majority of 
suburban spaces, and occupy half of the rural spaces. This also counterbalances the strength 
of the tenet modifications. 
Modifications using the tenets is the key to our learning experience. Our proposed 
Chinese COIN tenets and their modifications serve the same purpose. Just like the other 
COIN strategies, the player must choose a tenet before their turn and can never use the 
same tenet two turns in a row. Social class warfare reduces the cost for essential services 
and DIMEFIL cards are reduced by one. Changing the legal framework allows the coin 
player to win ties when on offense, re-rolling of the lowest dice when on defense, and incur 
no penalty when withdrawing. Coercive narratives provide a legitimacy point when 
removing all guerrilla fighters if the number of fighters is greater than the population size 
or when removing one auxiliary or underground. Compulsory education allows the coin 
player to remove half of the fighters in the space that has the least amount of guerrilla 
fighters after using a DIMEFIL card. Finally, the people’s fight allows the coin player to 
conduct one additional attack per engagement or utilize one additional DIMEFIL card 
during their turn. 
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When modifying the DIMEFIL cards, maintaining the current structure is key. They 
follow the same impacts on guerrilla fighters, auxiliary, and underground within the rural, 
suburban, and urban spaces. the theme of the cards should be switched to the following: 
government programs to dual track diplomacy, targeted killings to re-education, 
counterintelligence to HUMINT and TECHINT, and airlift to grassroots infiltration. This 
reinforces the tactics used in China’s COIN strategy while balancing functional gameplay. 
F. CONCLUSION  
China’s COIN tactics fall directly in line with its attempted control of DIMEFIL. 
China’s use of diplomacy is based on a two-track system that combines the efforts of local 
leaders guided and monitored by party officials while also using international relations to 
further their COIN efforts. Information plays a central role in China’s COIN strategy, 
combining the use of a “people’s struggle,” controlling information through suppression 
and dissemination, and using education to change the way of thinking. Military and law 
enforcement combine the use of the PLA, PAP, XPCC, and other citizen led paramilitary 
units to ensure compliance of the broadly defined laws China has changed to meet its needs. 
China uses economic and financial tactics to provide opportunities to those who are willing 
to support the CCP while preventing a share of the wealth to those who do not. Finally, 
HUMINT and TECHINT have created a surveillance state where actions are monitored or 
reported, with few ever truly flying below the radar. 
The five tenets for China’s COIN strategy are proposals in the absence of published 
doctrine or theory. The tenets serve as the basis for a strategy that attempts to overwhelm 
a domestic insurgency but can be easily exported to other nations create a multi-national 
effort when confronting a resistance organization. Furthermore, the tenets can also be used 
to categorize actions by the insurgent, or their advisors, to develop a counterstrategy and 
weaken the state. By providing the modifications to Rebels and States, players can use U.S. 
UW doctrine and the three strategists to determine the strengths and weaknesses of each 
side. Inherently, this will provide more information to current and future USSF soldiers as 
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